Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade by Daniel A. Farber
Berkeley Law
Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2-1-2012
Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the
Fairness of Cap and Trade
Daniel A. Farber
Berkeley Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade, 39 Ecology L.Q. 1 (2012),
Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2047
Pollution Markets and Social Equity:
Analyzing the Fairness
of Cap and Trade
Daniel A. Farber'
This Article considers three fairness issues relating to a cap-and-trade
system: fairness to industry, fairness to communities disproportionately
impacted by pollution, and fairness to low-income energy consumers. First,
assuming any compensation of industry is warranted, free allowances would
overcompensate firms for the cost of achieving emission reductions; industry
should not receive effective ownership of the atmosphere at the public's
expense. Second, environmental justice advocates argue that cap-and-trade
systems generate pollution hot spots and encourage dirtier plants to continue
operating to the detriment of certain disadvantaged communities. However,
cap and trade has no intrinsic tendency to produce increased emissions in
disadvantaged communities. Designers of cap-and-trade systems nevertheless
should be alert to possible hot spots, particularly in low-income and minority
communities. If hot spots are expected or emerge during the operation of the
program, responses could include creating geographic grading zones,
imposing ceilings on emissions in addition to the cap-and-trade scheme, or
prohibiting certain sources from purchasing allowances. Third, any regulation
of emissions raises costs, which has a disproportionate impact on low-income
consumers. This effect can be greatly ameliorated through adroit use of
revenue from emissions allowance auctions to offset the additional burden on
low-income consumers from increased energy costs. The bottom line is that
fairness issues are not a deal-breaker for cap and trade, but they do deserve
thoughtful consideration in designing a system.
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INTRODUCTION
Cap and trade is a common part of proposals to reduce greenhouse gas
emissionsi and economists promote it as a cost-reduction measure. 2 However,
use of cap-and-trade systems is controversial, in part because of concerns about
fairness. For instance, environmental justice3 advocates who focus on pollution
1. See generally David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's Shotgun
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21 (2008) (describing the
international use of cap-and-trade programs); see also SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., MIT JOINT PROGRAM
ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE PROPOSALS
2 (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rptl46.pdf (stating that "[a]
number of alternative approaches to greenhouse-gas mitigation are under consideration in the United
States, but the policy instrument now receiving greatest attention is a national cap-and-trade system").
The MIT report provides a good introduction to the design issues involved in creating such a system and
to methods for estimating costs associated with a cap-and-trade system. See id. at 3-9.
2. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 362 (1989).
3. For an introduction to environmental justice (EJ), see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
787 (1993). Sean Hecht describes the environmental justice perspective in the following way:
The EJ movement's primary goal is to lessen the [dis]proportionate burdens on low-income
and minority communities from human-created environmental risks. At the same time, the EJ
community has an abiding commitment to process-oriented goals, too. These goals include
integrating public participation and community-based knowledge and values into
decisionmaking at the level of individual decisions about how best to regulate activities,
2 [Vol. 39:1
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problems in disadvantaged communities argue that "evaluation of the world's
oldest and largest pollution trading programs for urban air quality reveals
immorality, injustice, and ineffectiveness in their outcomes." 4 Critics argue
that "many market-based approaches are designed in a way that will inevitably
treat low-income communities unfairly." 5 On the other hand, some scholars
view these criticisms as misguided obstacles to necessary environmental
measures, particularly when environmental justice advocates use litigation
against environmental agencies to block specific efforts to control greenhouse
gases.6 What makes the controversy so poignant is that proponents of these
projects, plants, and environmental and land use decisions that might affect local community
health. The movement regards community participation in regulatory decisions as among its
most cherished values. It is a core belief of EJ advocates that a process lacking in community
engagement at the project or plant level cannot lead to a sustainable long-term set of
solutions to the environmental inequities they are trying to eradicate-even if some decisions
good for the environment or even for EJ stakeholders might sometimes result from a process
without community engagement.
Sean Hecht, Reflections on Environmental Justice and AB 32's Emissions Trading Program, LEGAL
PLANET (Mar. 23, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/03/23/reflections-on-environmental-
justice-and-ab-32s-emissions-trading-program/.
4. Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles'
Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 289 (1999). Similarly,
another advocate of environmental justice contends that
the irrefutable fact remains that industrial facilities are overwhelmingly located in places
inhabited by people who cannot afford to move to cleaner surroundings. Allowing these
sources to purchase allowances in a market-based system in order to avoid the cost of
retrofitting their plants with pollution control devices will cause spikes in the levels of
pollution in the vicinity of the plant.
Rena Steinzor, Toward Better Bubbles and Future Lives: A Progressive Response to the Conservative
Agenda for Reforming Environmental Law, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,421 (2002), available
at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1860&context-facpubs. On
this basis, in 2008, "environmental justice groups from California issued a declaration against cap-and-
trade, stating that pollution already disproportionately affects low-income, [sic] communities of color,
and they will 'fight at every turn' against regulations that create a carbon-trading system that would only
exacerbate those trends." Kate Sheppard, Environmental Justice v. Cap-and-Trade, AM. PROSPECT (Feb.
28, 2008), http://prospect.org/article/environmental-justice-v-cap-and-trade. More specifically, the
declaration describes opposition to "a carbon trading and offset program." The Cahifornia Environmental
Justice Movement's Declaration on Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to Address Climate Change, EJ
MATTERS, http://www.ejmatters.org/declaration.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (emphasis added).
5. Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 111, 118 (1999).
6. For example, in discussing litigation surrounding the development of an emissions trading
scheme in California, Ann Carlson explained:
I should note that I'm quite sympathetic to concerns by environmental justice groups about
reducing air pollution from large sources in California. And in fact a number of the measures
CARB [the California Air Resources Board, which implements the state's greenhouse gas
program] has included in its scoping plan should help on the air pollution front: aggressive
moves to cut greenhouse gases from automobiles should also produce cleaner cars; the state's
requirement that utilities get 33 percent of their energy from renewable sources by 2020
should do the same. But I also think that the focus of AB 32 should mainly be on reducing
greenhouse gases. Other statutes require very strict limits on air pollution, including both the
federal Clean Air Act and the state's own air pollution laws. Those are the statutes that
should be used to regulate air pollution directly. CARB should have as much flexibility as
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differing viewpoints generally agree on the goals of environmental quality and
social justice; however, they vehemently disagree about how to prioritize these
goals and whether environmental justice concerns ought to be addressed
through greenhouse gas policy design or through a different type of regulation.
In order to understand the controversy, it is first necessary to understand
what cap and trade entails: it is an emissions-reduction method that sets a rigid
cap on emissions of a target pollutant for a constellation of regulated entities
but also leaves them significant discretion to decide how to comply.7 An
emissions trading scheme is based on the issuance of emissions allowances,8
which allow a firm that reduces its emissions to profit by selling unneeded
allowances to other present or prospective emitters or occasionally to
nonemitters entering the allowances market for speculative or environmentalist
purposes.9 Most trading systems limit the duration of permits to some specified
time, such as one year, but some systems allow banking permits for future use
or borrowing permits from future allocations to cover current emissions. 10 The
possible to implement AB 32 with a focus on reducing greenhouse gases as cost effectively
as possible. If it can do so by also maximizing co-benefits like air pollution they should do so
but the board's central focus should remain greenhouse gas emission reduction.
Ann Carlson, AB 32 Lawsuit: Assessing the Environmental Justice Arguments Against Cap and Trade,
LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 22, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/ab-32-lawsuit-assessing-
the-environmental-justice-arguments-against-cap-and-trade. Another observer suggested more simply
that "the EJ folks want to make life difficult enough for CARB that the Board gives in and gives their
constituency something." Jonathan Zasloff, Two Cheers for Environmental Justice Cynicism, LEGAL
PLANET (Mar. 23, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/03/23/two-cheers-for-environmental-
justice-cynicism/. Zasloff added: "If you don't like that attitude, you call it a shakedown; if you do like
it, then you call it leverage." Id. In his view, this leverage comes at a price:
AIR [the environmental justice group] is taking a real risk here: either they don't have
leverage, in which case CARB will re-analyze and just move ahead, or they do have
leverage, in which case the program might go defunct (I'm doubtful of this, but at some level
AIR must believe this is a possibility). And since the prime victims of climate change will be
low-income people of color in the Global South, calling it "environmental justice" in those
circumstances will be, shall we say, ironic.
Id. Environmental justice advocates obviously take a much different view and would reject some of the
assumptions underlying these criticisms. Sean Hecht presents a more sympathetic response to the
environmental justice position on AB 32. Hecht, supra note 3. This range of opinions indicates the level
of controversy surrounding the issue.
7. See, e.g., Cap and Trade, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/ (last updated Aug. 12,
2010). Note that "cap and trade" and "emissions trading system" are alternative terms for the same set of
policies. This Article will use the two terms interchangeably.
8. An allowance authorizes the holder to emit a given unit of emissions-often one ton-during
a given time period-generally one year, although sometimes longer. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 38505(a) (West 2011) (defining "allowance").
9. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 2, at 363-66 (providing a conceptual overview of emissions
trading). A related concept is the use of transferable fishing quotas to help maintain sustainable fish
stocks. See David Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons: Lessons Learned from the
Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833 (1997); Kristen M. Fletcher, When
Economics and Conservation Clash: Challenges to Economic Analysis in Fisheries Management, 31
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,168 (2001).
10. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade, 40 ENVTL. L. 1195,
1200 (2010).
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initial permit holders may be chosen in several ways: permits may be allocated
among existing polluters for free or for a price, or they may be allocated among
broader groups of applicants by auction or lottery. Once the pollution permits
have been initially allocated, they are transferable, and sale prices function as
free-market equivalents of pollution taxes. The permits have scarcity value
because emissions are subject to an overall cap that, market-wide, is below
current emissions or below emissions increases that would be expected under
business as usual.
To see the basic argument for a trading system, suppose that the
government has decided to reduce levels of a hypothetical air pollutant that is
well-mixed in the atmosphere so that a reduction anywhere is, effectively, a
reduction everywhere. In this scenario, the central policy question is how to
reach the emissions reduction goal cost-effectively, since the government has
already decided how much to reduce emissions and the effects are felt equally
everywhere. The government could achieve the desired emissions reduction by
using direct regulation to set emissions standards for individual emissions
sources, but this could be costly and time consuming.II However, because it
does not matter where on the planet emissions reductions happen, a better
alternative might be to set an overall limit on total emissions (a "cap"), allocate
emissions permits to pollution sources (for example, power plants), and then let
polluters trade permits among themselves so that the emission reductions will
come from the sources that can most cost-effectively reduce their emissions. 12
The cap determines the total emissions reduction, while the trading
process determines which sources reduce their emissions and to what extent.
For example, assume that one source (A) can eliminate one ton of emissions at
a cost of $1000, while another source (B) can do so for $500. A would come out
ahead by buying an allowance to emit one ton of the pollutant from B for
11. Direct regulation can be a cumbersome process, with many opportunities for judicial review as
each regulation is issued. It also requires the government to determine the best way for industry to
reduce emissions, although industry itself is likely to have a more complete understanding of its own
costs and technological opportunities. Oliver Houck, a staunch environmentalist, describes the
challenges of some specific technology-based standards vividly:
The development of technology standards was the most Herculean task ever imposed on an
environmental agency. EPA had literally to master the economics, engineering, and
technology in the most industrialized and [then] fastest-growing economy in world history. It
had to learn state-of-the-art and potential alternative technologies for each process. It had to
be able to defend its technology-forcing conclusions against the most experienced engineers,
economists and lawyers money could buy. Every draft standard EPA proposed was subject to
intense scrutiny, lobbying, and opposition from the affected industry and, within the limits of
its resources, at least one organization. Nearly every final standard was immediately taken to
court.
Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Substances Under the Clean Water Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,528, 10,537 (1991).
12. See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, supra note 2, at 368-69 (describing cap and trade).
2012] 5
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between $500 and $1000 dollars. 13 In this scenario, A would maintain its
current emissions level and would achieve compliance through the purchase of
the allowance, but B would cut its emissions by one ton while making a profit
from the sale of the allowance. After a series of such trades, a competitive
market should reach the point where no further trades are possible because total
emissions control costs have been reduced as much as possible. Although real-
world trading systems have additional bells and whistles, as well as
transactional inefficiencies, this simple version of a cap-and-trade system
illustrates the heart of the ideal 4: using emissions trading to achieve reductions
has the potential to reduce overall costs relative to direct regulation.
Even when a cap-and-trade system operates as planned, fairness-based
objections might arise. Some sources would end up buying emissions rights and
others would sell them, leaving some richer than others. 15 The distribution of
winners and losers would depend on the initial allocation process, and at least
some sources might view this process and its result as unfair.16 Furthermore,
while our hypothetical pollutant is generally well mixed in the atmosphere,
high-emission sources could end up concentrated in limited geographic areas
after the trading process, leading to undesirably high local levels of the target
pollutant (hot spots).' 7 In this case, less well-mixed co-pollutants produced
along with the traded emissions would be even more concentrated.' 8 Finally,
the costs of reducing pollutant emissions are likely to be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher energy bills and more expensive products,
which poses a special hardship for low-income communities.19
13. This is because B would profit from selling its credit at anything over $500 (not considering
transaction costs), and A would in essence profit by buying at any amount less than $1000.
14. In the law review literature, the classic article favoring cap and trade is Bruce Ackerman &
Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985). A carbon tax is another
option, but since it lacks an enforceable cap, emissions reductions would be uncertain.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part Ill.
18. See discussion infra Part Ill. As Alice Kaswan explains:
While CO 2 emissions do not raise direct distributive justice concerns, they implicate
distributive justice because CO 2 emissions do not occur in a vacuum. The combustion that
generates CO 2 also generates a range of harmful co-pollutants, including criteria pollutants
like particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides (NO,), ozone precursors, and carbon
monoxide (CO), as well as a wide range of toxic pollutants, including many volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), benzene, and other toxics.
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice And Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
Law Inst.) 10,287, 10,298 (2008).
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
6 [Vol. 39:1
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This Article focuses on the social equity20 implications of emissions
trading.21 It does not attempt to assess the economic benefits, effectiveness, or
political viability of using an emissions trading system versus alternatives such
as pollution taxes or direct regulation of sources. 22 Although overall program
effectiveness is an important issue, it is not emphasized here so that the Article
can instead focus more closely on the possible disparate effects of cap-and-
trade programs on various socioeconomic groups. 23 Equity and effectiveness
are distinguishable aspects of policy evaluation. 24 Equity relates to the uneven
impact of a program on different groups or individuals, whereas effectiveness
relates to whether the program achieves its primary goal. For instance, one
might oppose capital punishment for fairness reasons (differential racial
impacts or the past incidences of and continued potential for execution of the
innocent), because of doubts about its actual deterrent effect, or both. Although
the two issues may sometimes overlap, 25 separating equity from effectiveness
20. "Social equity" is a broad term. The National Academy of Public Administration defines it as
"[t]he fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract;
the fair, just and equitable distribution of public services and implementation of public policy; and the
commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in the formation of public policy." Standing Panel
on Social Equity in Governance, NAT'L ACAD. PUB. ADMIN., http://www.napawash.org/fellows/
standing-panels/standing-panel-on-social-equity-in-govemance/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
21. Much of the discussion applies generally to cap and trade schemes, but some is specifically
directed at the use of cap and trade for greenhouse gases.
22. For instance, the Article does not address the enforcement issues connected with
environmental trading systems. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-
and-Trade Regulation, 40 ENvTL. L. 1195 (2010). For discussion of design issues involved in cap and
trade systems, see Susan J. Kurkowski, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union:
Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 698 (2006); Lesley K. McAllister,
Beyond Playing "Banker": The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L.
REV. 269 (2007); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing
Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569 (2001);
Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Policy Challenges of Tradable Credits: A Critical Review of Eight Markets,
39 ENERGY POL'Y 575 (2011); Byron Swift, Emissions Trading and Hot Spots: A Review of Major
Programs, 35 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1020 (2004).
23. Just to be clear, this Article is not intended to endorse cap and trade as being preferable to
emission taxes or conventional regulation, whether in the context of greenhouse gases or otherwise. Any
one of these approaches may function well in some contexts but not others, and whether an approach
works well depends heavily on the specifics of how the approach is implemented.
24. Alice Kaswan highlights the different priorities placed on effectiveness and equity:
As environmental policies, environmental justice and market-based theories are diametrically
opposed. Market-based systems are designed to achieve aggregate reductions; they are
distribution-neutral. The efficiency of pollution reduction is key; spatial distribution is not. In
the world of environmental justice, in contrast, distributive justice is key: the issue is who
suffers the impacts of pollution. Economic efficiency is less important than distributional
fairness.
Kaswan, supra note 18, at 10,294.
25. There are two possible interconnections. First, if a cap and trade system would result in hot
spots of the targeted pollutant, that may be a problem from both the perspective of effectiveness (levels
of the targeted pollutant are not being reduced properly) and in terms of fairness. In the case of C0 2,
however, hot spots are generally not thought to be a pressing issue. But see Jessica Leber, Can Local
'Domes' of Carbon Dioxide Affect Human Health?, SCI. AM. (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id-can-carbon-dioxide-domes-affect-health. Second, if a cap-and-
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promotes analytical clarity. In any event, literature regarding the effectiveness
of cap and trade versus emissions taxes or conventional pollution regulation is
voluminous, 26 and this Article will not attempt to address it.
The stakeholders in the design of an environmental trading system have
varying interests and viewpoints. Such differences are not surprising in a
stakeholder group that includes consumer advocates, environmental groups,
environmental justice advocates, industry, and government agencies. It may be
impossible to reach a consensus on system design, but many conflicting
concerns can reasonably be addressed without impairing environmental goals.
I will discuss three aspects of distributional fairness related to cap and
trade: fairness in the distribution of emissions allowances to businesses,
fairness in the distribution of target and co-pollutant emissions among different
segments of society, and fairness in the relative financial impact of the cap-and-
trade system on low-income consumers of energy and energy-intensive
products.27
In order to provide some concrete context for this analysis, Part I presents
an overview of existing cap-and-trade systems and the experience we have
accumulated regarding their design and operation since the first program began
in 1990. While cap-and-trade systems have had varying degrees of success,
more important for our purposes is examining how program design relates to
fairness.
Part II analyzes fairness in the distribution of emissions allowances to
existing businesses under a cap-and-trade system. If allowances are distributed
free of charge, businesses may advocate particular allocation criteria-such as
distributing allowances based on historic emissions or on energy input--on the
basis of fairness. If, instead, allowances are auctioned, businesses will likely
argue that it is unfair to require them to pay for lawful emissions when they
have made past investments based on reliance on the legality of those
trade program is ineffective in reducing the targeted pollutant, this is obviously a problem in terms of
effectiveness, and is also a concern for equity advocates to the extent that the status quo distribution of
the targeted pollutant is considered unfair.
26. For a sampling of the literature, see, e.g., Reuvan S. Avi-Yuonah & David M. Uhlmann,
Combatting Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than
Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); Hahn & Hester, supra note 2.
27. This third issue has not yet attracted much attention by environmental justice advocates, as
David Super observes:
Higher prices are a necessary but negative consequence of carbon-emissions regulation, and
they will consume a disproportionate share of low-income people's resources. That negative
exposure thus would seem to make this an issue of environmental justice. To date, however,
the environmental justice movement has remained largely silent. Instead, it has continued to
focus on geographically distinct communities, rather than on people of color and low-income
people generally.
David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control and the Rules of
Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1150 (2010).
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emissions. 28 However, I present arguments against the large-scale free
distribution of allowances to industry. I conclude that we can compensate
businesses (to the extent we want to do so) with relatively small allocations of
free allowances, while auctioning the rest of the allowances.
Part III considers the fairness implications of cap and trade for hot spots of
the traded pollutant and accompanying co-pollutants in disadvantaged
communities. This is a major concern of environmental justice advocates. 29
Local pollution concentrations are broadly relevant to environmental policy
because of their potential negative impact on public health and welfare.
However, special concerns arise when a disproportionate pollution burden falls
on communities that are already economically disadvantaged or subject to
racial discrimination. The possibility of hot spots-or at least of a failure to
reduce concentrations in all communities proportionately-cannot be
dismissed, as it is impossible to perfectly predict the operation of any market,
whether for pollution allowances or otherwise. On the other hand, recent
empirical evidence suggests that emissions-trading systems have not performed
badly when measured by fairness to disadvantaged communities, which have
generally experienced significant reductions in pollution levels.
Part IV then considers fairness to low-income energy consumers-an
issue that has received considerable attention from economists. Any method of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is likely to increase energy prices as
producers pass emissions-reduction costs on to consumers, which will have a
regressive effect because energy and energy-intensive products make up a
larger percentage of the budget for low-income households. However, the
regressive effects of an emissions trading system can be ameliorated through
several mechanisms, such as allocating auction revenues to expansion of the
earned-income credit. 30
28. These disputes are important not only for businesses but for consumers who may ultimately
bear the costs of allowances in the form of higher prices. See discussion infra Part IV. Because business
costs may be passed along to consumers, different allowance allocation methods may affect groups of
consumers differently on the basis of geography or other factors. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. Concerns of environmental justice advocates regarding cap and trade are discussed in Lily N.
Chinn, Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading,
26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999); J. Andrew Hoemer & Nia Robinson, A Climate of Change; African
Americans, Global Warming, and Just Climate Policy for the US., ENvTL. JUSTICE AND CLIMATE
CHANGE INITIATIVE (July 2008), available at http://urbanhabitat.org/files/climateofchange-2.pdf; Noga
Morag-Levine, The Problem of Pollution Hotspots: Pollution Markets, Coase, and Common Law, 17
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 161 (2007); Seth B. Shonkoff et al., Minding the Climate Gap:
Environmental Health and Equity Implications of Climate Change Mitigation Policies in Cahfornia, 2
ENVTL. JUST. 173 (2009).
30. See generally ECON. AND ALLOCATION ADVISORY COMM., ALLOCATING EMISSIONS
ALLOWANCES UNDER A CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2010),
available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/eaac/documents/eaac-reports/2010-03-22_EAAC
Allocation Report Final.pdf (providing background information on emissions allocations and consumer
equity issues).
2012] 9
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A few words about terminology are in order before we begin. The terms
"emissions trading" and "cap and trade" will be used interchangeably
throughout this Article. "Pollutant" includes any harmful emission, including
carbon dioxide (CO2); a "regulated pollutant" or "target pollutant" is the
pollutant that is subject to the cap-and-trade system. Emitters will be referred to
interchangeably as "sources," "businesses," "plants," or "firms." Mobile
emissions sources, such as automobiles, will not be included in this discussion
because they have generally been covered by other forms of regulation; instead
sources are assumed to be stationary. The term "hot spot" will be used to refer
to high local concentrations of the regulated pollutant or co-pollutants emitted
along with the regulated pollutant. In the interest of providing a concrete
example to anchor the analysis, where the discussion is not specific about the
nature of the pollutant or the source, it may be helpful for the reader to envision
an electric power plant burning a fossil fuel, such as coal or natural gas, that
emits CO2 and its associated co-pollutants.
I. EXISTING CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEMS
In this Part, I discuss the operation and structure of some actual cap-and-
trade programs. Part L.A looks at the Acid Rain Program in the United States.
This was the first major implementation of cap and trade, and it remains a
lodestar for advocates of this approach. Part I.B discusses another effort to use
cap and trade to control conventional pollutants: the Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in Southern California. As we will see, the
performance of this program was less of a success story than the Acid Rain
Program and illustrates the importance of system design. Part I.C evaluates the
use of cap and trade as an option to control greenhouse gases by American
states and the European Union. Given the importance of climate change as an
environmental and societal issue, this use of cap and trade deserves careful
attention.
Examining these programs provides context for the subsequent equity
analyses while highlighting a number of ongoing controversies. For example,
the Acid Rain Program provides a different perspective on the merits of cap
and trade than RECLAIM provides. Similarly, the experience to date with
using cap and trade to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be seen either as a
demonstration of the political feasibility of this approach and its practical
potential, or as a sign that it fails to provide serious emissions reductions. Much
is in the eye of the beholder. Readers who are predisposed to favor cap and
trade, like many economists, may draw one set of lessons from this review,
while other lessons may appeal to environmental justice advocates and
environmentalists who find cap and trade suspect.
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A. The Acid Rain Program
The U.S. Acid Rain Program was the world's first significant emissions
trading system. Under the Reagan Administration, acid rain became a highly
controversial and heavily politicized issue. 31 The Administration opposed
congressionally proposed control programs and refused to take action in
cooperation with the Canadians on the problem. 32 The political deadlock was
broken during the first Bush Administration with the passage of the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act.33
With these amendments, Congress entirely bypassed the existing
mechanism for resolving interstate disputes and established a new nationwide
system to reduce sulfur-dioxide (SO2) emissions. 34 It created a cap-and-trade
system for addressing SO2 emissions, setting the absolute nationwide ceiling
(the "cap") on emissions from electric utilities at 8.9 million tons per year-an
estimated 10 million tons below 1980 levels. 35 Congress left the mechanisms
for achieving reductions unspecified, allowing individual firms to determine the
most appropriate compliance pathway, such as energy conservation, the use of
cleaner fuels, installation of pollution control technology, or purchase of
additional allowances. Congress authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to distribute allowances annually through a combination of
mechanisms, including auctions and free allocation to firms. 36 Allowances can
be transferred (bought and sold) beneath the cap. 37 Therefore, firms that are
able to reduce their emissions may sell excess allowances, creating an incentive
to develop and implement better emissions-control technologies.
The SO2 trading program was divided into two phases. In Phase I,
extending from 1995 to 1999 and covering a minority of the nation's steam-
electric generating units, 111 plants (listed in the statute by name) received
allowances for 2.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide per million British Thermal Units
(lbs S0 2/mmBTUs) of energy input and could emit more only if they obtained
additional allowances to do so.38 Phase II, which began in 2000 and applies to
31. See, e.g., Michael T. Kaufman, Canada Announces New Effort to Cut Acid Rain, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1984, at A6 (describing the Reagan administration as "stalling by insisting on further study and
research of the problem of acid rain, which many scientists say is killing life in lakes of Canada and
parts of the northeastern United States").
32. Id.
33. The acid rain provision now constitutes Subchapter IV-a of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7651-76510 (2006).
34. The existing interstate provisions were §§ 7410(a)(1)(D)(i) and 7426.
35. § 7651b(a)(1).
36. See id.
37. See id. § 765 1b(b).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(a) (2006); see also § 7651 c tbl.A (allocating allowances on a plant by
plant basis). EPA summarizes Phase I as follows:
Phase I included certain electricity generating units. EPA allocated allowances at an emission
rate of 2.5 pounds of S0 2/mmBtu (million British thermal units) of heat input, multiplied by
the unit's baseline mmBtu (the average fossil fuel consumed from 1985 through 1987). These
allowance allocations are listed in Table A of the Clean Air Act and codified in the
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virtually all steam-electric utility units in the country, tightened the cap.39
Large, poorly controlled plants receive base allowances of 1.2 tons
S0 2/mmBTUs of energy input,40 while a complex formula applies to smaller
plants.4 1 As discussed later, the reasons behind these allocation decisions seem
to have been as much political as anything else.
From the outset, this SO2 trading program provoked considerable
scholarly discussion and controversy about program costs, cost savings, and its
environmental and public health benefits. 42 The early history of the Acid Rain
Program produced mixed results. For example, trading between companies was
initially limited by public utility rules and flaws in implementation, which did
not prevent more common use of intracompany trading. 43 Trading later
expanded, and by March, 2002, at the Chicago Board of Trade's annual auction
of SO2 emissions allowances on behalf of the EPA, the average purchase price
for each of the 125,000 then-usable allowances was approximately $167 each,
indicating that the quantity of allowances was sufficiently restrictive to give
individual allowances significant market value.44 However, the program's
performance has continued to be somewhat uneven. In 2003, there was a four
percent rise in S02 emissions over the previous year,45 and in 2004, allowance
price jumped, likely due to increasing oil prices and expectations of tougher air
pollution regulations on the horizon. 46
Allowance System Regulations .... Alternative or additional allowance allocations were
made for various units, including affected units in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, which were
allocated a pro rata share of 200,000 additional allowances each year from 1995 to 1999.
Acid Rain Program SO2 Allowances Fact Sheet, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
trading/factsheet.html#how (last updated Apr. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Allowances Fact Sheet].
39. See § 765ld(b)-(f).
40. See id. §§ 7651d(b)(1), (c)(l)-2).
41. See id. §§ 765ld(d)(l)-(2), (e), (f)(1). EPA summarizes Phase II as follows:
EPA expanded the group of affected sources to include virtually all units over 25 MW in
generating capacity, and tightened the allowance allocation.... EPA allocated allowances to
each unit at an emission rate of 1.2 pounds of S0 2/mmBtu of heat input, multiplied by the
unit's baseline. Beginning in 2010, the Act places a cap at 8.95 million on the number of
allowances issued to units each year.
Allowances Fact Sheet, supra note 38.
42. See generally, e.g., Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility
Sector's Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxides Under the Clean Air Act, 14
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,094 (2003); Curtis A. Moore, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments:
Failing the Acid Test, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,366 (2004).
43. See Dallas Burtraw, Trading Emissions to Clean the Air: Exchanges Few but Savings Many,
RESOURCES, Winter 1996, at 3.
44. See Michael Bologna, Emission Trading: Results of Sulfur Dioxide Auction Suggest
Companies Anticipate Gentler Enforcement, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 678 (2002).
45. See EPA Report Shows Uptick in SO2 in 2003, Amid 38% Decline in Emissions Since 1980,
ELEC. UTILITY WK., Sept. 27, 2004, at 6.
46. See Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
Market, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125, 142-43 (2006). Kreutzer explains that
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Nevertheless, the general verdict is that the Acid Rain Program has been
successful in reducing emissions at a low cost.47 A 2011 data review suggests
that SO2 allowances have been much cheaper than originally expected because
industry found less expensive ways to reduce emissions, saving up to one
billion dollars per year in compliance costs. 48 Price increases for consumers
have presumably also been less than expected. To some extent, the program
benefitted from fortuitous changes in fossil fuel prices in favor of lower-sulfur
coal and natural gas. 49 Analytical efforts that attempt to control for these
changes report "savings of 43-55 percent compared to a uniform standard that
would have regulated the rate of emissions at a facility" and savings of twice
that amount as compared with "a mandate to use postcombustion controls"
such as scrubbers. 50 On the other hand, although the program does not appear
to have generally led to increased SO2 emissions in communities with large
[t]he price of an emission allowance on April 1, 2004 was $272. By June 2nd the price was
$375, and by July 1st the price was $425.... Two factors stand out as contributing to this
change in price. First, increases in oil prices make coal power more attractive. When
investors see or fear rising oil prices, they would become much less willing to part with
emissions allowances. The other factor affecting the price of emissions allowances springs
from a rule proposed by the EPA in January of 2004.
Id.
47. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM 2009 PROGRESS REPORTS,
available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP09.html; Steve Cochran, Debunking Clean Air
Scare Tactics: Part One, Acid Rain, CLIMATE 411 (Dec. 2, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/climate4l1/
2010/12/02/there-they-go-again/; see also Hahn & Hester, supra note 2. Sovacool summarizes the
program's accomplishments:
[F]rom 1990 to 2006 most areas of the northwestern and Midwestern United States saw wet
sulfate deposition, the major component of acid rain, decline by 25-40 percent and annual
ecological and health benefits from the Acid Rain Program's emission reductions are
estimated at $142 billion including the avoidance of nearly 19,000 premature deaths by 2010
(with annual compliance costs of only $3.5 billion).
Sovacool, supra note 22, at 577.
48. See WILLIAM C. WHITESELL, CLIMATE POLICY FOUNDATIONS 165-66 (2011). Sovacool
argued that
perhaps the most innovative component of the Acid Rain Program was the flexibility it gave
facilities in determining compliance. Some operators worked with railroads shipping low-
sulfur coal to reduce transportation costs, others adapted boilers with flue desulfurization
equipment, still others experimented in fuel blending. Suppliers of high-sulfur coal started
bundling allowances with coal to compensate buyers for the higher emissions and improve
the competitiveness of their product, also enabling arbitrage between fuels and allowance
markets. Other plants switched to cleaner fuels all together, retired and closed uneconomic
facilities, and purchased allowances from the market.
Sovacool, supra note 22, at 577.
49. See Dallas Burtraw & Sarah Jo Szambelan, U.S. Emissions Trading Markets for SO2 and NOx
11 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 09-40, 2009), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-
DP-09-40.pdf.
50. Id. (emphasizing the findings of "the two most convincing studies," which used different
analytical methods to arrive at similar conclusions).
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minority populations, it has unfortunately contributed to increased emissions in
some "poorly educated communities."51
From the perspective of advocates of cap and trade (though not necessarily
environmental justice advocates), the Acid Rain Program is an encouraging
example. But as we will see, implementation of cap-and-trade systems can
sometimes have more troubled histories.
B. The RECLAIM Program
Another major experiment with cap and trade took place in Los Angeles:
RECLAIM, Southern California's nitrogen oxides (NOx) and SO2 trading
program.52 In 1993, California's South Coast Air Quality Management District
established a cap-and-trade program under which stationary sources like oil
refineries received initial allowances of RECLAIM Trading Credits (RTCs)
that they could either utilize or sell to other facilities. 53 The market contained
390 facilities, accounting for two-thirds of the NOx emissions in the district.54
The district set initial allocation of allowances based on maximum emissions
during the 1989-92 period, with an adjustment to control for the total emissions
from all sources. 55 The amount of pollution represented by an allowance would
decline over time to lead to a reduction in total emissions across the district.5 6
51. See Evan J. Ringquist, Trading Equity for Efficiency in Environmental Protection?
Environmental Justice Effects from the SO2 Allowance Trading Program, 92 Soc. SCI. Q. 297, 297, 320
fig.5 (2011) (finding that "communities with high percentages of black and Hispanic residents
experience fewer imports of sulfur dioxide" although "[a]llowance trading does transfer SO2 emissions
into poorly educated communities"); see also Jason Coburn, Emissions Trading and Environmental
Justice: Distributive Justice and the USA's Acid Rain Programme, 28 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 323, 323
(2001) (finding that "[flor the first few years of the ARP, the emissions trading regime does not appear
to have been concentrating SO2 pollution disproportionately for the poor and racial minority
populations").
52. For a detailed description of the RECLAIM program, see generally Daniel P. Selmi,
Transforming Economic Incentives from Theory to Reality: The Marketable Permit Program of the
South Coast Air Quality Management District, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,695 (1994).
53. Selmi explains that the agency turned to cap and trade after political resistance to command-
and-control regulations became severe:
To implement the AQMP, a document that received widespread press coverage, the District
embarked on an extensive series of rulemakings designed to regulate a large number of air
pollution sources. Over a period of time, however, resistance gradually built to those efforts,
with objections centering on the cost of air pollution controls in the air basin and on the
allegation that the District's regulations were deterring businesses from locating or expanding
in southern California. Responding to the difficulties it faced in further implementing the
command-and-control rules called for by the plan, the District began a lengthy consideration
of whether an economic incentive system might accomplish the same air quality goals while
reducing both the costs and the level of government interference necessary to achieve those
goals.
Id. at 10,696-97. Note that further progress using cap-and-trade may not have been a feasible
alternative.
54. Id. at 10,698.
55. Id. at 10,698-99.
56. See id. at 10,699-701.
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RECLAIM has produced a mixed record.57 An overall assessment of the
program by EPA staff observed that "[e]missions have been reduced under
RECLAIM, but the program has also been criticized for delaying reductions,
over-managing the market, and perpetuating complexity and uncertainty." 58
Design flaws plagued the program.59 After initial overallocation of permits
provided no real incentive to install control technologies, the district
implemented changes that required "more reductions to meet tougher air
quality goals." 60
For example, the California electricity crisis in 2000 caused a price spike
that dramatically affected the market for allowances and resulted in removal of
the power sector from the NOx market. 61 When electricity wholesale prices
spiked at a time of high consumer demand, firms ramped up the capacity
utilization of "local power plants without additional emissions controls-
including older, higher-emitting peaking units" and "turned to the RTC market
to cover their higher emissions, thus rapidly depleting the available supply of
RTCs and driving prices up." 62 In response to this crisis, the South Coast Air
Quality Management District made extensive changes to the system. 63
57. Criticisms of the program are presented in Drury et al., supra note 4.
58. EPA CLEAN AIR MKTS. Div., AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES
MARKET (RECLAIM) 1 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/resource/docs/
reclaimoverview.pdf (hereinafter RECLAIM OVERVIEW].
59. According to Sovacool:
[R]egulators designed RECLAIM in a manner that exempted small new sources from having
to purchase credits. Nearly 90 percent of credits went to petroleum processors and electric
utilities, creating serious asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Source-specific limits on
pollution were not avoided by trading when trading partners could not be found. A
"contemporaneous requirement" meant that credits expired if they were not used, and distant
trades were disincentivized by penalties. Firms ... located in environmentally sensitive areas
were required to buy more than one credit for every additional unit they emitted, in essence
creating a geographically segmented market. The politics of setting up the system also
resulted in an over allocation of permits in the early years, meaning the quantity of
allowances issued exceeded the cap by as much as 37 percent. Further weakening the
program was the fact that firms were able to self-select their base year, meaning that many
overestimated their emission rates in order to get additional credits.
Sovacool, supra note 22, at 578.
60. See RECLAIM OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 1, 22.
61. See id at 8-9.
62. Id. at 6.
63. The changes included
remov[ing] power generators from market and required emission controls. Power generating
facilities greater than 50 MW were removed from the RECLAIM trading universe for 2001-
2003 and required to install Best Available Retrofit Control Technology (BARCT) controls
by the end of 2003. Though still required to comply with the program, power plants could no
longer purchase NOx RTCs to offset emissions. . . . The power sector could not re-enter the
market until and unless there was evidence that no negative impact on the rest of the program
or the state's energy security would result. The AQMD would re-evaluate the market in
2004.
Requir[ing] large sources to submit compliance plans. Facilities emitting over 50 tons
annually must submit compliance plans specifying their approach (via an enforceable
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Ultimately, despite problems, the program contributed to a 60 percent decrease
in NOx emissions from RECLAIM sources between 1994 and 2004.64
C. Emissions Trading of Greenhouse Gases
The next step in the development of emissions trading was to extend the
use of trading programs to greenhouse gases.
After prior consideration of a carbon tax, in January 2005 the European
Union began operating the world's first mandatory CO2 emissions trading
scheme. 65 For internal political reasons, the European Union differentially
distributed "its internationally agreed target" obligations among member
countries, ranging from "cuts of 28 percent (Luxembourg) to an allowed
increase of 27 percent (Portugal)" relative to a 1990 baseline period.66 E.U.
member states then established their own trading programs, using a variety of
schemes to allocate permits to their industries. 67 The program got off to a
rocky start,68 with disputes arising over, for example, allocations of emissions
commitment) for complying with NOx allocations .... Smaller sources (25 to 50 tons) were
required to submit informational reports projecting compliance for 2002 through 2005.
Improv[ing] RTC trade registration information. The AQMD adopted changes, including
requirements for timely registration of trades, to provide more accurate and timely market
information to participants.
Add[ing] new mobile and area source credit generating rules. The amendments included
additional credit rules to provide more opportunities to generate RTCs, such as replacing
diesel-fired heavy-duty vehicles with clean technologies and pilot credit generation programs
for marine vessels, hotelling operations, truck/trailer refrigeration units and agricultural
pumps.
Id. at 9-10.
64. Id. at 12. A recent statistical study of program data determined that pollution reductions were
greater for plants within the RECLAIM system than in similar California plants outside the system (not
subject to cap and trade):
Our empirical results indicate that emissions reported by facilities in the RECLAIM program
fell by significantly more over the fifteen year study period (i.e., 1990-2005) as compared to
emissions reported by a group of California facilities located in non-attainment counties,
operating in the same industries, with similar pre-RECLAIM emissions levels. When we
narrow our focus to the window of time surrounding the cross-over point (i.e., the point at
which the aggregate cap began to bind), we continue to find that emissions reductions among
RECLAIM firms are significantly greater on average as compared to the matched controls.
Meredith Fowlie et al., What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern
Calhfornia's NOx Trading Program, 102 AM. ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwpl86.pdf. More equity issues are discussed infra notes 146-
149 and accompanying text.
65. Matthew Saltmarsh, Market for Emissions Picks up Steam as Kyoto Protocol Takes Hold,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 6, 2005, at 19.
66. Richard N. Cooper, Europe's Emissions Trading System (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate
Agreements, Discussion Paper 2010-40, Aug. 2010) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CooperETSfinal.pdf.
67. See id. at 2-5.
68. Sovacool explains some of the design flaws in the program:
Although the scheme covers more than ten thousand fossil fueled power plants, oil refineries,
coke ovens, iron and steel plants, and factories producing cement, glass, lime, brick,
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among countries and the overall cap on CO 2, which many argue was set too
high (as was also true in the RECLAIM program). 69 A third phase, with more
ambitious targets and greater use of auctioning, is planned for 2013-21.70
However, due at least in part to overly generous cap setting, allowance
distribution, and offsetting rules, to date the E.U. trading system does not
appear to have experienced great success in reducing emissions. 71
Although greenhouse gas emissions trading has yet to develop on a
national level in the United States, a group of Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic
states have agreed to a carbon cap-and-trade system among electrical power
plants-the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 72  Seven states signed a
memorandum of understanding in December 2005, committing to a detailed
trading program. 73 Currently, ten states participate, and the fourteenth auction
of allowances has just taken place. 74 As I will discuss in Part III.B, California
is also en route to imposing a large-scale trading scheme.
D. Issues Common to Existing Cap-and- Trade Systems
Many of the details of these systems and their results are not crucial for
the purposes of this Article because they relate more directly to effectiveness
ceramics, pulp and paper, it encompasses only carbon dioxide and not other potent
greenhouse gases. Emissions credits were distributed for free as a rough function of past
emissions, yet such a concession provided firms an incentive to emit more during the early
years of the program in order to receive a larger future allocation. Furthermore, national
governments let firms determine their own baselines and set their own abatement cost curves,
with most firms electing to revise their estimates upward to obtain more generous
allowances. Finally, regulators compromised on a five-year commitment period therefore
providing little incentive for long term low-carbon investments (such as buildings or power
plants) spanning more than the five-year window. These compromises greatly reduced the
efficacy of the program. During the first phase of distributing allowances, the largest emitters
were granted more rights to emit than they needed to cover their actual emissions.
Sovacool, supra note 22, at 581.
69. See David Gow, UK Victory Rips Hole in EUs Pollution Trading Scheme, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 24, 2005, at 25. Allowance prices have fluctuated from as little as one euro to as much
as thirty. The low initial price resulted from an overallocation of allowances. See Lesley McAllister, The
Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395,
408-11 (2009); Kurkowski, supra note 22, at 711-22. For more information on the E.U. system, see A.
DENNY ELLEERMAN & PAUL L. JoSKOW, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN
PERSPECTIVE 32 (2008), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-
Report.pdf.
70. See Cooper, supra note 66, at 13-15. During this phase, the E.U. will also "deliberately favor
its poorer members with permits in excess of what would be allocated to them under normal guidance."
Id. at 15.
71. See id. at 21-22; Ben Schiller, Europe's CO2 Trading Scheme: Is It Time for a Major
Overhaul?, YALE ENV'T 360 (Apr. 28, 2011), http://e360.yale.edulfeature/europesco2-trading
scheme isit time for a major overhaul/2396/.
72. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2012)
[hereinafter RGGI WEBSITE].
73. See generally Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Memorandum of Understanding (Dec. 20,
2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou 12_20_05.pdf
74. See RGGI WEBSITE, supra note 72.
ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY
than to equity. It would take a book to fully evaluate their design and operation,
and much of the book would concern cost and effectiveness in reducing total
emissions rather than proportionality between affected communities. However,
there are some lessons to be learned that are relevant for present purposes.
One observation common to all the examples given above is that
implementing an effective cap-and-trade scheme is not a simple matter.75 Most
of the programs. experienced slow starts in trading, initial overallocation of
permits, or other significant problems. Midcourse corrections are often needed.
While the principle of emissions trading is clear and elegant, implementation
involves a host of technical details that are critical to successful operation of
the system.
One issue is that the theory behind cap and trade is well established, but
there is still a great deal we do not understand about how emissions trading
systems actually operate. As the authors of a 2007 review concluded, "Though
we have some evidence of significant cost savings through emissions trading
schemes, we know much less about how effective (in terms of measurable
environmental benefits) and fair (in terms of distributional burdens) they
are." 76 They further noted that "[t]he studies that do exist are laudable and
informative, yet their methodological limitations caution against strong
conclusions."77 As we will see in the remainder of this Article, recent research
has addressed some of these gaps, but there is still much we do not know.
When analyzing the overall case for cap and trade versus alternative
methods of emissions reductions, these uncertainties about implementation are
cause for concern. On the other hand, alternative methods of controlling
emissions have their own difficulties. Although a carbon tax is an attractive
75. Based on case studies of several systems, Sovacool has argued that certain defects are intrinsic
to cap and trade:
[P]olitics constrains the efficacy of tradable permit mechanisms, placing pressures on them to
bring benefits to stakeholders in the present (at the expense of future generations) and to
particular regions and sectors (at the expense of others). Human behavior in tradable permit
markets is unpredictable; a sort of wild card that can distort even the most rigorously
designed schemes. Firms and individuals often find ways to use or manipulate tradable credit
markets to accrue benefits to them. In some cases traders refrain from participation due to
distrust of the market mechanism or significant volatility in credit prices. In others
compromises in design have weakened penalties for non-compliance (or excessively
distributed allowances), reducing incentives to participate. In still others firms influence the
design of a particular scheme so that it convey [sic] rents to them and acts as a powerful tool
for impeding competition or raising revenue.
Sovacool, supra note 22, at 583. Note that Sovacool did not survey the environmental benefits achieved
by cap and trade systems, only their flaws, nor did he provide comparisons to other regulatory
approaches or indicate that other forms of regulation were politically feasible. See id at 575, 583.
However, it is hard to quarrel with the conclusion that "one should be wary about endorsing tradable
permits as a panacea." Id. at 583.
76. Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, Prescriptive Environmental Regulations Versus Market-
Based Incentives, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 14-15 (Jody Freeman &
Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007).
77. Id. at 15.
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theoretical concept, it has design and implementation issues of its own. 8
Similarly, while we have more experience with environmental command-and-
control regulations, they can be very time-consuming and expensive to develop
and implement. 79
However, these issues of effectiveness are distinct from those pertaining to
fairness. A cap-and-trade system might be effective in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, but its benefits and burdens could fall very unevenly on different
groups. On the other hand, whether or not using cap and trade is more effective
than alternative forms of regulation, it might be better (or worse) at equalizing
the pollution burdens and benefits of regulation experienced by various
segments of society.
The remainder of this Article explores the fairness issues relevant to
emissions trading schemes, with primary attention given to potential cap-and-
trade programs intended to control greenhouse gases. We begin with the
question of how to allocate emissions allowances fairly to industry.
II. FAIRNESS TO INDUSTRY
The mechanism used to distribute emissions allowances is a key part of a
cap-and-trade program. If it provides allowances to emitters free of charge,
then, to actually regulate the quantity of emissions, the trading program
requires a system for determining the specific allocation of permits to different
sources. For instance, allocation could be based on plant output, so that power
plants with the same generating capacity would receive the same number of
allowances. Alternatively, allowances might be distributed on the basis of past
emissions, so that sources with high past emissions would receive more
allowances than less polluting sources. Another option is to auction emissions
allowances to the highest bidders. A combined approach could involve
distributing some allowances for free while auctioning the remainder.
Allowance distribution naturally involves fairness considerations for the
regulated industry. Under an auction system, firms with high current emissions
might argue that it is unfair to require them to purchase emissions allowances
from the government or from other firms. They would assert that their
shareholders invested in a company that was operating in complete compliance
with the law but is being impacted by new government policies such that they
ought to be "grandfathered in." The economic impact of the allowance system
is not limited to shareholders. In the electrical power industry, this is not simply
a question of fairness for utility shareholders. It is also a question of fairness to
consumers, especially low-income consumers, who will have to pay higher
78. After all, the income tax is also an attractively simple concept, but its actual implementation
has become complex and fraught with political controversy. See, e.g., John Steele Gordon, A Short
History of the Income Tax, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.con/
article/SB10001424052970204422404576594471646927038.html.
79. See Houck, supra note 11.
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prices for electricity as a result of higher industry costs. The distribution among
industry may have geographic implications, in effect favoring consumers in
some areas of the country over consumers in other areas, or distribution effects,
such as impacting low-income consumers compared to higher-income
consumers. Conversely, others might argue that no one has a property right to
using the atmosphere for disposing of pollutants-instead, the atmosphere
belongs to the public. From this perspective, being allowed to emit is a
privilege for which firms should have to compensate the public. This Part
attempts to evaluate these and other fairness claims regarding allowance
allocation.
A. Distributing Free Allowances Based on Political Considerations or
Baseline Pollution
In the U.S. Acid Rain Program, allocations of emissions allowances
appear to have been manipulated in the interests of regional equity and other
political considerations. Recall that the program distributes allowances for free
according to complicated provisions relating to individual power plants and
their characteristics. 80 In essence, allocation occurs on a source-by-source
basis, rather than on the basis of a single, uniform formula, and there are a
variety of provisions that potentially provide emitters with additional
allowances. 81
This complicated scheme of distribution does not have a straightforward
policy explanation. One observer found it "difficult to imagine what lies behind
these special bonuses and exemptions [under the Act], other than the kind of
special interest deal that proponents of emissions trading had hoped their
system would preempt." 82 Indeed, some critics have surmised that legislators
"saw little distinction between the Clean Air Act and a fight over which
defense installation to close, or an appropriation for public works projects,"
concluding that "[t]he pork tastes as good, from whichever barrel it comes." 83
While raw politics may certainly affect the distribution of emissions
allowances across industries and even among individual sources, the political
details behind these decisions are sometimes complex. For example, one
economic study found that members of Congress from some coal-producing
states pursued benefits for miners and sustained demand for high-sulfur coal
under the Acid Rain Program by creating incentives for installing SO2
scrubbers rather than trying to obtain additional allowances. 84 Additionally,
80. See discussion supra Part L.A.
81. See discussion supra Part I.A.
82. Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 330
(1995).
83. Id.
84. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based
Environmental Policy: The US. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37 (1998) (statistical study of
voting patterns finding only limited influence by "special interests").
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representatives of some states that used high-sulfur coal accepted higher
allowance allocations in earlier years in exchange for lower allocations in later
years, rather than receiving higher total allocations.85 Therefore, although these
local interests did influence the process, the overall result may have been
relatively benign in that they merely changed the form of or postponed, rather
than diminished, overall pollution reductions. Unfortunately, the absence of
recorded votes on allowance distribution makes it hard to tease out more
specific political coalitions. 86
The potentially political nature of the allocation process can be seen as
either a positive or a negative. Considered in isolation, the politicization of
allowance allocation does not seem to make for good public policy, since
political influence-rather than principled analysis of what is required to
protect public health and welfare-determines the outcome. However, the
potential for using the allocation process to further local or regional political
goals could prove to be a politically valuable tool for proponents of reduced
emissions in overcoming legislative political opposition to emissions
regulation. The ability to assuage antiregulatory interests through the allowance
process is a feature inherent in cap and trade (when at least a portion of
allowances are free rather than auctioned), as opposed to emissions taxes or
conventional regulation.
It is tempting to try to neutralize complaints about the negative economic
impacts of an emissions trading scheme by awarding allowances based on
current or past pollution levels-in effect, "grandfathering" current emitters
into the program by giving larger emitters more allowances-but we should not
do so reflexively. Economists report that grandfathering can protect stock
prices in the fossil fuel industry and firms that rely on fossil fuels.87 Yet they
contend that this can also be accomplished by providing only a small portion of
allowances for free, because companies also benefit from the higher consumer
prices that result from regulation.88 Thus, fairness to industry provides at most
an argument for small-scale distribution of free allowances, rather than for
avoiding allowance auctioning entirely.
Environmental scholars and economists are generally critical of
grandfathering existing pollution sources. A recent review of the literature
concluded that "[m]ost of those economists and policy analysts who have
examined the practice [of grandfathering, also called "transition relief,"] have
concluded that in many circumstances, relief undermines the goals of policy
85. See id
86. Id. at 67.
87. See A. Lars Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of
CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?, in BEHAVIORAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 45 (Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf eds., 2000).
88. See id. at 79.
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change." 89 In the words of one economist: "[G]randfathering is in the selfish
interest of incumbents in an activity, especially of firms in an industry, and
allows them to benefit without appearing to stand in the way of legal
change." 90
In response, advocates of free distribution of emissions allowances argue
for recognizing an implicit property right to emit "on the grounds that firms
have been given rights by the state to operate on the basis that they provide
socially beneficial goods and services to society." 91 These firms produce
valuable goods and services, such as the electricity needed for lighting and
heating. Advocates of free allowances argue that, since emissions are an
unavoidable byproduct of the production process, firms should not be charged
for lawful emissions.92 In other words, firms should not have to pay for
emissions permits, regardless of whether or not the permits are marketable.
From this vantage point, the alleged unfairness is not the fact that firms must
incur expenses in order to decrease emissions to the level required by law, but
the fact that even after doing so, firms must pay a fee for their remaining lawful
emissions. This is an interesting if somewhat counterintuitive argument, which
89. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 110
(2011). Quite apart from industry equity concerns, putting a price on carbon in globally competitive,
energy-intensive industries might result in leakage of emissions to countries without a carbon price. See,
e.g., Cristoph Bohringer, Carolyn Fischer & Knut Einar Rosendahl, Cost-Effective Unilateral Climate
Policy Design: Size Matters 35 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 11-34, 2011), available at
http://www.rff org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationlD=21608.
90. Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 37, 82 (2008). As Jonathan Remy Nash observes:
Traditional grandfathering-based systems make initial allocations of grandfathered rights-
that is, the right to continue to engage in the behavior that will be restricted going forward-
in accordance with a rule of first possession. The allocation of resource access in this way
creates an incentive for societal actors to engage in a race to capture future resource access,
on top of the then-existing race to capture the resource itself Commentators have elucidated
the tragedy of the commons nature of the race and have criticized it for creating incentives
for competitors to expend inefficiently too much effort toward winning, and for causing
inefficiently early distribution-and depletion-of the resource at issue.
Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental
Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811 (2009).
91. Gilbert Metcalf, Paying for Greenhouse Gas Reductions: What Role for Fairness?, 15 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REv. 393, 397 (2011). Although he does not take a position on the validity of this
argument, Metcalf argues that recognizing such a property right would not be inconsistent with
imposing a cap on emissions:
At first blush this appears to conflict with the economic prescription for efficiency that firms
recognize the full costs of using resources in production. Those full costs include the climate
change damages arising from greenhouse gas emissions. There is, in fact, no conflict at all.
Tradable emission schemes have two key design elements. The first is the carbon price which
is set by the intersection of demand for permits and the supply. The second is the means of
allocating those permits. The carbon price ensures that firms internalize the external costs of
climate change. As noted above, how the permits are allocated is entirely separate and can be
determined through political negotiation or the reliance on some principal of property rights.
Id.
92. Id.
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contrasts with the widely accepted idea that polluters should pay for the harm
they cause society by internalizing the true costs of their activities even if they
have not previously been required to do so. This argument would provide a
basis for opposition to both cap-and-trade programs that auction allowances
and emissions taxes.
B. Distributing Allowances by Auction
It is helpful to put to one side the argument for transition relief or
grandfathering based on the claim that companies justifiably planned their
investments assuming that they would not have to pay for emissions. In order to
do so, we can ask whether a country that is just beginning industrialization and
has established an emissions trading system preemptively (in the absence of
incumbent emitters) should use free allocation or an auction to distribute
emissions allowances. Apart from normative arguments for public ownership of
the right to clean air, as opposed to recognizing private ownership of the right
to pollute, 93 a practical argument arises in favor of auctioning. Understanding
this argument requires a brief exploration of the effect of capping emissions on
prices.
The basic point is that some firms will collect windfall profits due to
generally rising energy prices if allowances are free. 94 Industry can meet an
emissions cap in either of two ways or through a combination of the two. First,
it can reduce output in order to achieve corresponding reductions in emissions.
Reducing output creates scarcity, forcing buyers to bid up prices. Second,
industry can use new technologies or switch to less emissions-intensive fuels to
meet the cap. Because this raises production costs95 and energy is a fungible
commodity, industry-wide prices increase. Higher prices are charged for all
output, including output from plants that do not use pricey new technologies or
more expensive fuels. Therefore, whether industry meets the cap through output
93. See PETER BARNES, WHO OWNS THE SKY? OUR COMMON ASSETS AND THE FUTURE OF
CAPITALISM 53-59 (2001).
94. As a Congressional Budget Office analyst explains:
If companies benefited from the [energy] price increases but did not have to purchase the
allowances, they would receive windfall profits, which could be very large. For example, in
2000, CBO estimated that if emissions were reduced by 15 percent and all of the allowances
were distributed free of charge to producers in the oil, natural gas, and coal sectors, the value
of the allowances would be 10 times the combined profits of those producers in 1998. Thus,
the windfall gains that they would receive as a result of the free allocation would far
outweigh the loss in sales that they might experience as consumers cut back on their use of
fossil fuels.
The Distributional Consequences of a Cap-and-Trade Program CO2 Emissions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Income Security and Family Support of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, I 1th Cong. 9
(2009) (statement of Terry M. Dinan, Senior Advisor, Congressional Budget Office), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10018/03-12-ClimateChangeTestimony.pdf [hereinafter Dinan
Testimony].
95. If new technologies or production methods lowered costs, presumably companies would have
adopted them without the compulsion of regulation.
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reductions (compared with business as usual, in the absence of a cap), new
technology, or fuel switching, the resulting system-wide electricity price
increase raises profits for status-quo facilities. 96
The preceding analysis applies to competitive, unregulated markets.
Utility regulation may prevent firms from collecting windfall profits, but
conventional rate regulation also mandates that firms be able to earn reasonable
returns even if the cap-and-trade system imposes additional costs such as
allowance costs. 97 Thus, the equity argument for free allowances fails for
regulated utilities, although the windfall profit argument may not apply.
Although calculating the precise effect of a distribution scheme is complex
and uncertain, giving allowances away for free is plainly regressive. On the
other hand, auctioning allowances shifts the economic benefit of allowance
value to the government (and, hence, to the taxpayers). Auctioning thus
prevents the trading system from effectively granting emitters a property
interest in a right to emit that results in long-term windfall profits for industry
shareholders at the general public's expense. 98 It also allows the government to
apply auction revenues to counter the regressive effects of the remaining
energy price increases on low-income consumers. 99
96. As economists from Resources for the Future explain:
The suggestion of free distribution through grandfathering to incumbent emitters without
adjustment should be the most popular approach for industry because it awards an asset
worth tens of billions of dollars. In the electricity sector, which is the focus of our study, such
an approach would lead to substantial net profits (windfall profits) as a result of climate
policy. This occurs because the increase in revenues associated with the increase in
electricity price would greatly outweigh the increase in costs resulting from compliance with
the program when emissions allowances are given away for free.
Dallas Burtraw, Margaret Walls & Joshua Blonz, Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing Policies in
the Electricity Sector 8 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 09-43, 2009), available at
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-09-43.pdf. The increase in revenues associated with the increase
in electricity price would greatly outweigh the increase in costs resulting from compliance with the
program when emissions allowances are given away for free. The price increases are significantly
smaller in regulated markets (where state regulators control prices) than in competitive markets. Id. at 9.
97. For an introduction to utility rate regulation, see Robert J. Michaels, Electricity and Its
Regulation, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/ElectricityandltsRegulation.html ("'Cost of service' regulation sets retail rates to recover expenses
and give a "fair" return on capital."). The argument in the text regarding competitive markets applies,
however, when utility markets have been deregulated and are no longer subject to "cost of service"
regulation.
98. This is somewhat analogous to the difference between tariffs and import quotas in
international trade. An import quota reduces supply of the product, which drives up prices, allowing
producers to reap the same benefit as they would have if they had entered into a price-fixing agreement.
Although a tariff can produce the same reduction in imports, the government, rather than producers
themselves, collects the tariff.
99. For example, auction revenue can be used to decrease taxes. See Dallas Burtraw & W.H.
Parry, Options for Returning the Value of CO2 Emissions Allowances to Households (Res. for the
Future, Discussion Paper 11-03, 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-l l-03.pdf.
Burtraw and Parry argue that efficiency strongly favors this option:
A theme of our discussion is that these trade-offs can be quite stark. In particular, economic
theory suggests that addressing ethical, distributional, and feasibility goals can imply
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Despite this argument, free distribution has considerable political appeal
because it reduces industry opposition to regulation. Yet, the commonly used
method of basing free allowance allocation on historic emissions levels has
obvious disadvantages. First, this choice of baseline penalizes with lower
allowance allocations on par with their lower historic emissions levels emitters
who invested in earlier emissions reductions, while rewarding laggards who did
not invest in such technology. Second, it favors current emitters over new
sources, which are often more efficient, emit less, and consequently may
receive fewer allowances because their historic emissions are lower. The new
sources may even have to purchase allowances from existing plants if they are
built after the trading system goes into effect (since their baseline emissions are
zero). Again, this results in a penalty to those that already emit less.
In the event a cap-and-trade program intends to base allowance allocation
on historic baseline emissions, it is important to incorporate safeguards against
"gaming" the system.100 These include ensuring adequate data to establish an
accurate baseline, selecting a baseline prior to proposal of the trading scheme
(to avoid the temptation to increase emissions in order to achieve a higher
baseline), adjusting past emissions based on currently available control
technologies, and creating a clear standard for calculating the baseline
amount. 101
In sum, it seems better to auction emissions allowances to avoid these
problems. Auctioning eliminates the need to devise a complicated allocation
scheme, and it prevents firms from gaining windfall profits from the economic
value of free allowances. At most, a relatively small share of allowances should
considerably higher overall program costs. In fact, using at least some of the revenue to
execute a tax shift by lowering distortionary taxes may be needed to ensure that costs to the
economy with cap-and-trade are lower than with other alternatives, including direct
regulation.
Id. at 3. They contend that "[u]sing CO 2 revenue to reduce preexisting taxes would be an investment in
economic efficiency that would be likely to have positive effects throughout the income distribution by
promoting economic growth, even if the immediate beneficiaries of the tax reduction are not distributed
evenly." Id. at 23.
100. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic
Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2011). As Ruhl and Salzman explain, while
all standard-setting approaches are subject to gaming, [] the temporal component of historic
baselines sets them apart from the other approaches and opens up qualitatively different
strategic opportunities. While historic baselines may seem like innocuous, inert dates from
the past, it turns out they are well suited for intense gaming in ways that favor particular
political or economic interests, potentially diluting the effectiveness of the baseline while
appearing to anchor and guide regulatory policy. Strategic framing of the unit of the baseline
or the way in which success toward achieving the target is measured can infuse malleability
into the baseline over the long term.
Id at 8.
101. Id. at 28-44; see also Nash, supra note 90, at 811 (explaining the argument for using a
retrospective baseline and pointing out that this approach is also susceptible to strategic behavior if firms
learn to anticipate its use in future regulation).
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be distributed free to firms in order to compensate their shareholders for the
financial burden of reducing CO2 emissions.1
02
III. FAIRNESS, HOT SPOTS, AND CO-POLLUTANTS
Power plants and motor vehicles are the major sources of a variety of air
pollutants produced by burning fossil fuels. 103 Therefore, measures aimed at
reducing CO2 emissions, like a cap-and-trade program, may reduce the use of
fossil fuels and have the salutary side effect of reducing co-pollutants from
these sources. 104 There is controversy, however, over whether the benefits
from this possible reduction would be spread fairly across different
communities. 105 The debate is heightened because of concerns that existing
pollutant emissions are themselves spread unevenly, with certain communities
bearing the brunt of air pollution.106
102. As one report explains:
To create a level playing field, the government needs to freely allocate only a fraction of the
permits. Based on [] model simulations . . . only about 13% of the permits must be freely
distributed to the major affected industries in order to prevent losses of profit. The remainder
of the permits can be auctioned, thus generating revenues to finance cuts in pre-existing
distortionary taxes-thereby offsetting the adverse effects of the new C02 policies.
Richard D. Morgenstern et al., The Distributional Impacts of Carbon Mitigation Policies 2 (Res. for the
Future, Discussion Paper 02-03, 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-IB-02-
03.pdf.
103. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? State Controls Within a Federal
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 351 (2010) ("[C]arbon dioxide
emissions are almost always accompanied by more hazardous co-pollutants. Particulates, sulfur oxides,
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, benzene, and mercury are common co-pollutants.").
104. See id. ("Where low-cost emission reducers reduce significantly, the surrounding area could
experience significant emission reductions of both GHGs and co-pollutants.").
105. See Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, the Present, and Back to the
Future, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701 (2002) (providing a good summary of the equity concerns of
environmental justice advocates).
106. See Mary B. Collins, Risk-Based Targeting: Identifying Disproportionalities in the Sources
and Effects of Industrial Pollution, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S231, S231 (2011) ("Although
methodological debates remain, most studies have supported the contention that racial and ethnic
minorities and people of low socioeconomic status are disproportionately exposed to environmental
hazards."); Paul Mohai, David Pellow & J. Timmons Roberts, Environmental Justice, 34 ANN. REV.
ENv'T & RESOURCES 405, 405, 425 (2009) (reviewing "two decades of scholars' claims that exposures
to pollution and other environmental risks are unequally distributed by race and class" and concluding
that "[h]undreds of studies have now documented unequal exposures by race, ethnicity, and economic
class"); see also Marie Lynn Miranda et al., Making the Environmental Justice Grade: The Relative
Burden of Air Pollution Exposure in the United States, 8 INT'L J. ENVTL. & RES. PUB. HEALTH 1755,
1755 (2011) ("[W]ithin areas covered by [] monitoring networks, non-Hispanic blacks are consistently
overrepresented in communities with the poorest air quality."); Sara Grineski, Bob Bolin & Christopher
Boone, Criteria Air Pollution and Marginalized Populations: Environmental Inequity in Metropolitan
Phoenix, Arizona, 88 Soc. SCI. Q. 535, 535 (2007) (finding "that Census block groups with lower
neighborhood socioeconomic status, higher proportions of Latino immigrants, and higher proportions of
renters are exposed to higher levels of criteria air pollutants" in the metropolitan Phoenix area); Rachel
Morello-Frosch & Russ Lopez, The Riskscape and the Color Line: Examining the Role ofSegregation in
Environmental Health Disparities, 102 ENvTL. RES. 181, 186 (2006) (noting that low-resolution air
quality monitoring of major metropolitan areas, although not detailed enough to allow analysis "of
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Hot spots are areas of heavy, localized concentrations of a pollutant.107
Because emissions trading does not augment or affect minimum local pollution
standards in a way that could prevent hot spots, it is poorly suited to address
unevenly distributed air pollutants that directly impact public health.os
Conversely, cap and trade is an appropriate regulatory solution for persistent
(and, therefore, well-mixed) pollutants that lack strongly localized negative
health effects. In the latter situation, emissions trades between different sources
will have little impact on local concentrations of the pollutant, minimizing
distributive justice complaints. However, the target pollutant may be produced
in conjunction with hot-spot-forming co-pollutants that may already be
subjected to regulatory requirements-or which theoretically could be
subjected to such requirements-outside of the cap-and-trade system. CO2 is
such an example. It is fairly well mixed in the atmosphere and lacks direct
negative local impacts, characteristics that some of its co-pollutants do not
share.' 09 While target pollutant hot spots call into question whether cap and
trade is a suitable method for regulating that pollutant, co-pollutant hot spots
raise the question of whether to adjust (or abandon) the cap-and-trade approach,
neighborhood level effects" reveals a correlation between "Black-White segregation ... and increased
metropolitan-wide levels of sulfur dioxide and ozone"); Manuel Pastor Jr., James L. Sadd & Rachel
Morello-Frosch, Waiting to Inhale: The Demographics of Toxic Air Release Facilities in 21st-Century
California, 85 Soc. SCi. Q. 420, 420 (2004) ("Analytical results suggest a pattern of disproportionate
exposure [to toxic releases] based on race, with the disparity most severe for Latinos . . ."); Rachel
Morello-Frosch et al., Environmental Justice and Regional Inequality in Southern California:
Implications for Future Research, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 149, 149 (2002) (Study results "indicate
that communities of color bear a disproportionate burden in the location of treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities and Toxic Release Inventory facilities . . . [and] that facility siting in communities of
color, not market-based 'minority move-in,' accounts for these disparities").
107. Cap and Trade Frequent Questions, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/faqs.htmnl (last
updated Apr. 09, 2009). Hot spots "may accumulate in small areas within the larger pollution control
region. Some pollutants do not have significant site-specific impacts, but others create localized
pollution problems around the emitting source." Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology:
Using an "Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 290 (1994).
108. One legal scholar notes that
under technology standards, the hotspot is an artifact of feasible pollution control technology
or locational clustering, while under emissions trading, varying levels of air quality are
hardwired into the design of the regulatory instrument. Locally uncontrolled air pollution at a
given location is a plausible outcome under emissions trading, in contrast to uniform
standards, where, by definition, some control is required everywhere.
Morag-Levine, supra note 29, at 104.
109. Kaswan describes the distinction in the following way:
Trading programs focus on achieving an aggregate goal cost-effectively, not on the
distribution of emissions. That feature may appear irrelevant in the GHG context, as the most
prevalent GHG from stationary sources, carbon dioxide, does not have local environmental
consequences. However, carbon dioxide emissions are almost always accompanied by more
hazardous co-pollutants. Particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic
compounds, benzene, and mercury are common co-pollutants.
Kaswan, supra note 103, at 351.
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or to instead pursue hot spot amelioration separately and in addition to cap and
trade by enacting regulations specifically targeted at co-pollutants.
A basic concern is the possibility that "[i]f facilities with high costs of
control are located in [especially] polluted areas and rely upon allowance
purchases rather than reducing emissions, air quality will not be improved" in
these disproportionately burdened places.1 0 Even if a trading system reduces
co-pollutants across the board, disadvantaged communities will likely continue
to bear a disproportionate share of the pollution burden and might not receive
their fair share of co-pollutant reduction benefits.111 Furthermore, if air
pollution regulations are not strict enough, pollution in these communities
could remain high or actually increase if local facilities are used more
heavily.112 For instance, plants in especially polluted communities might
increase capacity utilization under a cap-and-trade system, resulting in higher
emissions of CO2 and co-pollutants with direct negative health impacts.
These are not negligible concerns. Although the best solution might be to
improve the general regulation of the co-pollutants in question to prevent hot
spots or reduce their impacts on disadvantaged communities, this may not be
feasible in the context of real-world regulatory politics. However, it should be
possible to design a cap-and-trade program or related regulations in order to
counter these effects,"l 3 or to use auction revenues to benefit impacted
communities.114
I begin with a general discussion of the normative and economic
arguments related to environmental justice concerns about co-pollutants and
pollution hot spots in Part III.A, then consider real-world experience with the
issue of hot spots and emissions trading programs in Part III.B.
In considering these arguments, it is important to keep in mind that the
comparison has to be a relative one. If dirtier plants find it worthwhile to buy
allowances in order to continue operation, they would probably also be willing
to continue to emit and pay an emissions tax that had similar practical and
financial effects on the company. Likewise, if the cheapest way for industry to
comply is to reduce emissions at cleaner plants even further, rather than
reducing emissions at dirtier plants, an agency issuing regulations might
similarly find it appealing to focus on cutting emissions at the cleaner plants
while imposing only token restrictions on the dirtier plants, particularly if the
regulatory scheme is based on technological and economic feasibility. Thus,
alternatives to cap and trade may also have equity effects that are quite similar.
Even if cap and trade turns out to have undesirable equity effects, those effects
110. Alice Kaswan, Reconciling Justice and Efficiency: Integrating Environmental Justice into
Domestic Cap-and-Trade Programs for Controlling Greenhouse Gases, in THE ETHICS OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE 232, 240 (Denis G. Arnold ed., 2011).
S11. See id. at 241.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 249-52.
114. Id at252.
28 [Vol. 39:1
POLLUTION MARKETS AND SOCIAL EQUITY
could be unavoidable given the need to reduce emissions. Rather than assuming
that equity issues are unique to cap and trade, an equity-based critique of cap
and trade should be accompanied by a showing that other approaches would
actually reduce disparate treatment of disadvantaged groups within the context
of a cap-and-trade program.
A. Normative and Economic Arguments
A major concern of environmental justice advocates is that emissions
allowances might disproportionately end up in the hands of dirtier plants, which
may themselves be disproportionately located in disadvantaged communities.
This section will investigate the likelihood of this outcome and its normative
implications. While the argument has intuitive appeal, upon closer examination,
we will see that its validity depends on particular factual settings.
This section opens with a close examination of the potential industry
decision to use a limited pool of allowances to maintain emissions at inefficient
plants and to decrease emissions at efficient ones in order to achieve the
reductions required by an industry-wide emissions cap. If lower production
costs and lower emissions per unit of output are not correlated, the outcome of
the analysis depends on the relative weight of these two factors. I will also
assume that businesses base their decisions on rational strategies for making
profits, and that regulations other than the cap-and-trade scheme do not
interfere with decisions about production levels, fuel choices, or emission
controls. As we will see, however, under most circumstances, the analysis of
how emissions reductions are distributed among sources does not turn on the
details of the cap-and-trade system such as the use of offsets, the availability of
credit banking, or the initial allocation scheme-provided that the system is
sufficiently credible (and any offsets are sufficiently expensive) and that
emission allowances have a price greater than zero. Note, however, that these
factors could become relevant if the dirtier plants are also the most efficient
ones (in terms of the profit ratio per unit of emissions). 15
The analysis below has a limited goal. It is not intended to "prove" that
cap and trade never creates or intensifies hot spots of co-pollutants. There is no
115. For example, Levine, Graves, and Metin estimate that
at a CO 2 price of $10/ton, an efficient gas-fired plant (e.g., a combined cycle plant with a
7,000 Btu/kWh heat rate) will displace an inefficient coal-fired power plant in the dispatch
order (at the assumed $6/MMBtu gas price and $1.70/MMBtu coal price) . . . [while]
efficient coal plants can survive against some gas plants up to as high a price for CO2 as
$80/ton, at which point even an inefficient gas plant will displace a typical efficient coal
plant (assumed to have a 9,000 Btu/kWh heat rate). Thus, coal is not thoroughly displaced by
gas until CO2 prices are in the range of $50-$ 100/ton ....
Steven H. Levine, Frank C. Graves & Metin Celebi, Prospects for Natural Gas Under Climate Policy
Legislation 3, 4 fig. 2 (The Brattle Grp., Discussion Paper, 2010), available at http://www.eenews.net/
public/25/14909/features/documents/2010/03/24/documentgw_01.pdf. Note, however, that this
analysis could shift if other regulations of coal fired plants are implemented that increase costs, or if coal
mining is subject to regulations that increase the price of coal substantially.
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reason to think that this is impossible. In any event, because the analysis is
based on certain assumptions, it does not purport to draw universal conclusions.
Instead, it is intended to show that there is no intrinsic or abstract tendency of
cap-and-trade systems to produce hot spots or differentially direct emissions
reductions toward cleaner plants rather than the dirtier plants that are more
likely to impact disadvantaged communities. 116 In short, there should be no
presumption that cap and trade disfavors disadvantaged communities in terms
of hot spots or co-pollutants.
Environmental justice advocates may well be right to argue for the
contrary conclusion, given the actions of specific firms in a specific regulatory
environment. This argument would require evidence based on specific
conditions because of the weakness of the theory that cap and trade inherently
disfavors disadvantaged communities. Detailed quantitative modeling of
particular industries and regulatory schemes should be undertaken to search for
potential inequitable changes in the geographic distribution of pollutants.
Unless modeling demonstrates the potential existence of a problem, there is no
reason to presume in advance that pollution reductions will be distributed
unfairly.
Putting aside the empirical question of what impacts cap and trade actually
has on emissions of co-pollutants in disadvantaged communities, I examine the
normative question of how we should respond to whatever impacts actually
result from cap and trade. It is reasonable to argue that emissions restrictions
aimed at controlling greenhouse gas emissions in order to address climate
change should also decrease the disproportionate air-pollution burden
disadvantaged communities may already suffer. However, cap and trade may
not lend itself to this form of affirmative action. To fully evaluate this
argument, we would need to weigh this potential negative against the potential
benefits of cap and trade, such as lower cost (which would translate into lower
prices for consumers, including the disadvantaged) versus greater effectiveness.
Higher energy prices are likely to have a regressive impact on low-income
consumers, as I will discuss later.
From a practical standpoint, we also need to keep in mind the dangers of
seeking the perfect regulatory scheme with no regard for political feasibility,
rather than settling for a good approach that is politically achievable. For
instance, we might hesitate before gambling the future of the planet on the hope
that long-standing public attitude about taxes can be completely transformed to
116. The contrary assumption is common. For instance:
Even without trading programs, "grandfathering" provisions in environmental laws that
establish more lenient standards for existing polluters than for new polluters provide
incentives for old, heavily polluting industries to continue to pollute. Trading programs will
provide additional incentives for those facilities to continue to pollute and will perpetuate the
distributional inequities that are already caused, in part, by "grandfathering" provisions.
Johnson, supra note 5, at 130.
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a positive attitude, while resisting alternative methods to address climate
change in the meantime.
1. Understanding Differential Incentives for Emissions Reductions
Under Cap-and- Trade
The intuition underlying distributional concerns about emissions trading is
that "[o]lder, heavily polluting industries may find that it is more cost-effective
to continue polluting and to buy pollution rights than to install new
technologies to reduce pollution."ll 7 However, this intuition may sound more
plausible than it really is.118 A cap-and-trade system is like a rationing system.
Suppose you own a new car and an old clunker. It is difficult to imagine
circumstances where the imposition of gasoline rationing would cause you to
cut back on driving the new car more than the old car. It is equally implausible
to assume that companies would cut back on efficient plants rather than less
efficient ones when required to "ration" their pollutants.
Admittedly, it is more profitable for industry to continue to pollute than to
install new technologies in those plants.119 Therefore, companies would prefer
to continue polluting at old plants rather than changing their ways. But this is
not really the issue because an effective environmental trading scheme does not
leave companies free to pollute. Capping emissions means that at least some
companies will have to reduce pollution somewhere. So the central question is:
Why would installing new technologies or reducing capacity at inefficient
plants be less cost-effective than installing new technologies or reducing
capacity at newer plants?
Under a cap-and-trade scheme, dirtier plants can only continue to pollute
at precap levels if cleaner plants reduce emissions. Reducing emissions at a
117. Id. at 129. The same intuition would presumably apply to a pollution tax, so the analysis in the
next few paragraphs of the text is equally applicable in that setting. Another principle of environmental
justice is community participation. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved
Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 459 (2002) (discussing this aspect of environmental justice).
Cap and trade might be criticized on this basis, since market transactions between polluters do not
require community input. However, disclosure of transactions and their pollution impacts would at least
give communities a chance to advocate program modifications. Although it is appealing to
environmental justice advocates, the downsides of greater public participation are more delay and
expense in issuing permits. As David Super observes, "the direct costs of the consultative processes and
uncertainty about their outcomes make industry more resistant to regulation, possibly necessitating
concessions on the substantive level of emissions reductions." Super, supra note 27, at 1152.
118. As a recent economic study explains, "market-based programs could mitigate pre-existing
environmental justice problems. If relatively dirty facilities with low marginal abatement costs are
disproportionately located in traditionally disadvantaged neighborhoods, a well functioning permit
market should ensure that a larger share of the mandated emissions reductions will be achieved in these
areas." Fowlie et al., supra note 64, at 11. My argument is that this phenomenon is more likely.
119. This is true unless companies are irrational, and, since irrational companies should be
eliminated by the market over time, in general, companies should have already voluntarily installed
pollution reduction technologies if doing so was cheaper than polluting. The fact that regulation is
required at all shows that, currently, polluting is cheaper than not polluting. This assumes rational
business actors that are well informed about the relative financial costs and benefits of different options.
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cleaner plant makes business sense only if it is more cost effective than
reducing emissions at a dirtier one. However, "[t]he economic logic of trading
suggests that the largest, dirtiest facilities should be able to reduce emissions
most easily (i.e., they should have relatively low marginal abatement costs),
and hence emissions trading might lead to a cooling effect rather than the
creation of hot spots."120
Some additional aspects of cap-and-trade schemes also deserve mention
but do not change my analysis. First, a trading program may allow the use of
offsets (emissions reductions that take place outside the group of regulated
entities to compensate for in-system emissions) as an alternative to purchasing
allowances. Authorizing the use of offsets should reduce demand for (and,
therefore, the price of) allowances and create a market for the offsets alongside
the allowance market. If the allowable level of offsets is set high enough that
they completely eliminate the need to buy allowances, the cap-and-trade system
will have no impact on emissions from industry and hence no effect on equity
(measured relative to the preemissions market status quo). In short, the impact
will be equal (zero) in all communities. If offset opportunities cost money and
are limited in supply, the same question arises as for allowances: Why would a
firm (or industry as a whole) use offsets to avoid pollution reductions from
dirtier plants rather than cleaner ones? This makes sense only if pollution
reductions (whether achieved via capacity-utilization reductions, fuel
switching, or the installation of additional pollution control equipment) are
more cost effective (relative to continued emissions plus offset cost) at the
cleaner plants. In short, the key for determining where cuts will be made
remains the relative cost effectiveness of cuts at different plants.
Second, some cap-and-trade systems provide for emissions allowance
banking or borrowing. In order to bank emissions, a business decreases current
emissions in order to save allowances for the future (either received free or
purchased at auction), when it must choose to use the banked allowances
against emissions from dirtier plants or cleaner ones (assuming it owns a
mixture of both). Conversely, to borrow allowances, the firm decreases its
future emissions allowance allotment in return for increased emissions today.
Again, the question remains: Why use banked or borrowed allowances to
increase allowable emissions at a dirtier plant rather than a cleaner one?
A third aspect of emissions trading systems that might seem pertinent is
the initial distribution of allowances. However, under most circumstances this
120. Burtraw & Szambelan, supra note 49, at 8. They also report "empirical evidence from Phase I
[of the Acid Rain Program] supporting the notion that the largest, dirtiest plants cleaned up the most.
The greatest reductions in emissions by far (in tonnage and percentage) were in the Midwest, the area
with the greatest power plant emissions historically." Id. However, another study investigated "the
market-based system compared to a command-and-control alternative and [found] that low-income
populations received slightly lower benefits on average from Title IV, echoing environmental justice
concerns, although predominately black and Hispanic communities received a disproportionately large
share of benefits relative to their costs." Id.; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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also turns out to be largely irrelevant to the choice between reductions at dirtier
and cleaner sources. 121 If firms must purchase allowances by auction, they
have to decide whether to buy allowances from the government or to reduce
emissions instead. Assuming an effective cap (as all these thought experiments
do), allowances are most valuable where emissions reductions are least cost
effective. Similarly, when allowances are initially distributed for free, an owner
must decide whether to use the allowances, buy more at the going market rate,
or sell at that rate. Keeping the allowances is profitable if the cost to the
company of reducing pollution is greater than the market price for
allowances-that is, greater than what other firms are willing to pay (which is
based on their own comparisons of market price and their emissions-reduction-
related costs). Therefore, a firm should, for example, only keep allowances for
its own use if it is unable to reduce its emissions as efficiently as other firms
that might buy the allowances.
Despite all the potential variations of functional cap-and-trade systems, the
bottom line is that firms will use allowances to cover emissions at plants where
reductions are least cost effective. The details of the scheme make little
difference because all trading schemes involve a limited supply of pollution
rights (whether in the form of current allowances, borrowed future allowances,
or offsets). If there is a limited supply of a commodity and a competitive
market, the commodity will end up in the hands of the entities that are willing
to pay the most for it. Since the alternative to purchasing an emissions
allowance is to reduce emissions, the rights are most valuable to firms with the
most expensive options for reducing emissions. The question is not whether
companies would like to have full emissions rights for their most polluting
sources but whether reducing emissions is more or less cost effective for dirty
sources or cleaner ones.
In most industries, the cleaner plants are likely to have less "headroom"
for improving their performances because they are closer to state of the art than
older plants. In many circumstances, the cleaner plants will be the newer ones.
Older plants are subject to less strict current regulation than newer ones
because of the grandfathering issue discussed earlier. 122 For this reason, newer
plants in the same industry are likely to use more advanced pollution control
technology and/or cleaner fuels and will have a higher incremental emissions-
reduction cost. Hence, in most industries, the newer plants would be likely to
121. A qualification is in order. If the method of allocation itself provides incentives for industry-
for instance, by rewarding plants with high output or high capacity-then the industry's decisions about
how to meet the cap will also be affected as firms attempt to increase their shares under the allocation
system. See Rolf Golmbek et al., Price and Welfare Effects of Emission Quota Allocation 32 (Statistics
Nor., Research Dep't, Discussion Paper No. 661, 2011), available at http://www.ssb.no/publikasjoner/
DP/pdf/dp661.pdf.
122. Provisions of the Clean Air Act that are particularly aimed at new plants include 42 U.S.C. §
7411(f) (2006) (standards of performance for new stationary sources), § 7475 (preconstruction
requirements), § 7502(c)(5) (permits in nonattainment areas), and § 7503 (permit requirements in
nonattainment areas).
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purchase allowances from older plants (or to outbid them if allowances are
auctioned), thereby forcing emissions reductions at older plants. In other words,
older plants often present more "low-hanging fruit" in terms of possibilities for
additional pollution control.
Another way to reduce a plant's need for allowances is to decrease
capacity utilization by reducing production levels (energy generation, in the
case of a power plant). Reducing production decreases a source's total
emissions (although not necessarily the emissions intensity per unit of
production). Under some circumstances, it might be more economical to reduce
capacity utilization at newer plants rather than older ones. One possibility is
that production costs per unit of output are lower at the dirtier plant. 123 In this
sub-Part, I have assumed that being economically efficient (having a low cost
per unit output) and being clean (having low emissions per unit output) go
together. If that assumption does not hold, however, the analysis becomes more
complex, and the result depends on the scarcity of allowances (and hence their
price).124 In this scenario, there is a tradeoff between production costs and
123. This appears to generally hold true in today's electricity markets: older plants tend to be less
energy efficient coal-fired plants and produce power more cheaply than newer plants, which tend to be
more energy efficient natural gas-fired plants. As of the end of 2010, 73 percent of all coal-fired
electricity generation capacity in the U.S. was at least thirty years old, while most natural gas-fired
capacity was added during the last decade. See How Old Are U.S. Power Plants?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyin brief/age of elecgen.cfm (last updated Aug. 8, 2011).
Although natural gas-fired capacity now exceeds coal-fired capacity, coal-fired plants account for
significantly more actual power generation. For example, in 2010, coal-fired plants generated 45 percent
of our nation's electricity, while natural gas-fired plants contributed only 24 percent. See Electric Power
Annual 2011: Net Generation by Energy Source by Type of Producer, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
tbl.2.1.A (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/table2.l.a.pdf. This is due in
large part to the economic reality that, per unit of power output, coal-fired plants currently have lower
operational costs:
In the United States, most baseload electricity generation is delivered from coal, nuclear, and
hydroelectric power stations. Because natural gas tends to be a higher-cost fuel, natural-gas-
fired power stations more typically are used to cover incremental power requirements that
arise during times of peak demand or during sudden outages of baseload capacity.
ERIN MASTRANGELO, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF PRICE VOLATILITY IN NATURAL
GAS MARKETS 3 (2007), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/features/ngprivolatility.pdf. From 1999
through 2010, average annual operating expenses (including the costs of operation, maintenance, and
fuel) for coal-fueled plants varied between 46 percent (in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2005) and 73 percent
(in 2010) of the operating expenses for natural gas-based plants per kilowatt-hour of electricity
produced. See Electric Power Annual 2010: Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major U.S.
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 1999 Through 2010, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. tbl.8.2 (2011),
available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/table8.2.pdf. During this time frame, the average
annual operating expenses (per kilowatt-hour) for coal plants varied from 2.012-4.048 cents, while the
range for natural gas-burning plants was 3.747-7.072 cents. Id. Natural gas price volatility is even more
pronounced over shorter than annual periods of time. See MASTRANGELO, supra, at 16 (concluding that
"[a] high degree of price volatility seems inherent in natural gas markets owing to the nature of the
commodity, supply capacity constraints, and the sensitivity of peak day demands to temperatures" and
that "even under relatively low levels of volatility, financial risk can be large as daily price movements
expand"). Coal prices have not been nearly as volatile.
124. See ECON. AND ALLOCATION ADVISORY COMM., supra note 30, at 23-24.
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efficiently reducing emissions.125 The cheaper process will continue to be used
until the price of allowances rises enough to outweigh the difference in
production costs. 126 Here, the choice between reducing emissions at cleaner
plants and dirtier ones could be affected by the availability of borrowing and
offsets because this affects the price of allowances.
Because these issues are complicated, it may be easier to see the logic
underlying the analysis by working through a specific example. The next sub-
Part uses a simple hypothetical situation to tease out the logic of emissions cuts.
2. An Illustrative Scenario
Assume that a company owns two plants-a dirty plant and a clean one-
and an emissions cap requires it to cut its total emissions by two units. Which
plant will it pick for instituting the emissions reductions? Here are some
specifics to make the example more concrete: Both plants produce the same
product, and each unit of the product sells for $100. If the firm chooses to
reduce emissions by cutting back production, two factors will determine which
plant it chooses. First, if one plant produces fewer units of the regulated
pollutant per unit of output than the other, the more polluting plant would
require a smaller production cut to obtain the same emissions reduction. All
things being equal, this makes cuts at more polluting plants more economical
than cuts at less polluting plants. Second, the same production decrease might
save more money at one plant than the other due to differences in production
costs. If neither plant is currently operating at full capacity, we can assume that
their current marginal costs of adding or subtracting one unit of production are
the same. (Otherwise, the company could make money by shifting one unit of
production from one plant to the other).
This example examines output cuts as a method of reducing emissions.
Instead, reductions could be made through process changes (such as fuel
switching) or installation of pollution control technology. Regardless, the
central issue will be the relative cost effectiveness of emissions reductions at
the two plants. This turns on the amount of investment or operational expense
required to reduce emissions. Because process changes or pollution control
equipment may require significant capital investments, the decision will depend
in part on whether the cap requires sufficiently large emissions reductions to
justify the investments. Thus, a large reduction requirement might make it
worthwhile to make such an investment, whereas a small cut might not.
125. According to the EPA, natural gas-fired generation results in "half as much carbon dioxide,
less than a third as much nitrogen oxides, and one percent as much sulfur oxides at the power plant" as
coal-fired generation. Clean Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergyl
energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2007).
126. For example, Levine, Graves, and Metin estimate that allowance prices will need to rise above
$10 before it becomes economical to do something about the most inefficient coal-fired plants. See
Levine, Graves & Metin, supra note 115, at 3, 4 fig.2.
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To return to the output-reduction example, let us assume that the current
marginal cost at both plants is $95, so that cutting back by one production unit
saves the company $95 in costs and loses it $5 in profits. Assume that an
additional production cut (for a total cut of two units) saves another $90 in
marginal costs. 127 Finally, the clean plant yields half the emissions per unit of
production that the dirtier plant yields.128 Therefore, a reduction of one unit of
emissions requires cutting two production units at the cleaner plant or one at
the dirtier plant.
We are finally in a position to work out the company's decision. It has two
choices:
Cut back the cleaner plant's production by two units. This reduces revenue
by $200 (at $100 per unit), and reduces costs by $95 for the first unit and $90
for the second unit. So the total loss of profit is: $200 - $95 - $90 = $15.
Cut back the dirtier plant's production by one unit. This reduces revenue
by $100 and costs by $95, so the total loss of profit is $5.
Clearly, the company can maximize its profits by cutting production at the
dirtier plant rather than the cleaner one. But note that this result hinges on the
relative costs of production: if production costs are sufficiently higher at the
cleaner plant, cutting two units at the cleaner plant might make more sense than
cutting one unit at the dirtier one.
3. Limitations on the Analysis
This example allows us to spot scenarios where the result might be
different. One possibility is that cutting two units would justify the company
raising its prices. In a competitive market, this could not happen, but if the
company is a monopoly and the regulator is sufficiently inept, perhaps cutting
back two units would allow the company to raise its prices enough on all its
production (as compared with a one unit cutback) to compensate for the loss of
profits from the extra sales.
Another possibility is that the dirtier plant is dramatically cheaper to
operate than the cleaner one. If the marginal cost at the dirtier plant is only half
as high as the marginal cost at the cleaner one, then cutting two units at the
cleaner plant might be more profitable than cutting one unit at the dirtier one.
One might think that if the dirtier plant was that much cheaper to operate, the
company would have simply built an identical new one. But perhaps
regulations make new plants of this type less desirable, or even illegal, while
grandfathering old ones. Note that in this case, it is at least clear that the cap-
127. The difference between $95 and $90 is based on the assumption that production becomes less
profitable as a plant increases its level of output due to more wear-and-tear on equipment, more need for
overtime, and so forth.
128. This is roughly the difference in carbon intensity between natural gas- and coal-fired plants.
Gas v. Coal, GLOBAL GREENHOUSE WARMING, http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/gas-vs-
coal.html (last updated Mar. 10, 2010).
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and-trade scheme will not increase emissions at a dirtier plant that is already
operating at capacity. Also note that only operating costs are relevant in
determining production levels for existing plants: capital costs may be higher
for new, cleaner plants, but those costs are fixed and have to be paid regardless
of the production level.
There are other scenarios in which a cleaner plant might cut back more
than a dirtier one. Perhaps the two plants produce different products (for
instance, baseload power versus peak electricity), and demand for the two
products changes differently due to the price increase caused by the output
reduction under the cap-and-trade scheme. 129 In other words, demand is more
elastic for one product than the other. Finally, in a regulated industry such as
the retail electricity market, some quirk in the regulatory system might produce
perverse results. 130
These are some possible scenarios to consider, but ultimately the point is
that there is nothing inherent in cap-and-trade systems that directs allowances
to dirtier sources. If anything, in most industries efficiency and low emissions
go together. We would normally expect new plants to be more economically
efficient than old ones, because technological progress makes improvements
possible and companies would normally want to take advantage of better
technology when building new facilities. It is also more natural to assume that
new plants are less emissions-intensive than old ones, both because greater
efficiency should translate into producing more output with the same amount of
energy and other inputs, and because pollution regulations for newer plants are
likely to be tougher. These assumptions may sometimes fail, which is why we
should not dismiss out of hand the concern that imposing an industry cap would
result in more cuts at cleaner plants than dirtier ones. For instance, newer plants
might be deliberately designed to make it easier to add further pollution control
equipment in the future as needed, whereas no one imagined that further
pollution controls would ever be needed when the old plants were built. 131
Although my analysis is not ironclad, the empirical evidence cuts in its
favor. For example, under the Acid Rain Program, regions with the dirtier
plants ended up with the greatest percentage reductions. 132 Thus, rather than
129. For instance, if one plant produces only baseload power and the other only peak power, it may
not be feasible to substitute one for the other. Or, if the same cap-and-trade scheme covers both
electrical generators and non-power-producing industrial plants, the different economics of industrial
production versus electricity production could affect the outcome.
130. For example, a regulatory agency might not set electricity prices in a way that gives a utility
an incentive to minimize expenditures on emissions allowances or that penalizes it for selling unused
allowances. Under these circumstances, the trading system may not direct allowances to the sources with
the highest compliance costs.
131. Once the old plants have upgraded to match the newer plants, assuming that is possible, they
will both face the same costs for further improvements, so both types of plants should then further
reduce emissions proportionately.
132. See, e.g., Swift, supra note 22, at 10-11. Swift also draws some conclusions from the data
about fears of geographical shifts in pollution patterns:
2012] 37
ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY
allowances flowing disproportionately to the dirtiest plants, those plants on
average used fewer allowances in proportion to their total emissions than the
cleaner plants.
Similarly the most recent empirical study of the RECLAIM program
reports that the dirtier plants - those sources with the highest emissions-made
larger emissions reductions.133 One finding showed that, "for each additional
ton that a facility emitted in period 1, it reduced emissions between periods 2
and 3 by an additional 0.06 tons relative to the control group."' 34 Since the
control group consisted of plants subject to conventional pollution control
regulations of the kind that would have applied in the absence of RECLAIM,
this finding means that dirtier plants reduced emissions more under cap and
trade than under conventional regulation. Indeed, it means that, relative to the
status quo, the communities impacted by these dirtier plants received a larger
benefit from cap and trade than communities near cleaner plants, narrowing the
gap between these communities. Along with the results of the acid rain study,
these empirical results are more consistent with the theory developed in this
Article, which denies any systematic tendency of cap and trade to favor dirtier
plants.
Of course, as discussed above, the general tendency of cap and trade to
encourage cuts in dirtier plants does not always translate into reality. The
empirical evidence discussed above applied in situations quite different from
carbon trading, and we should be cautious about assuming that the findings
carry over to other settings. 135 But the possibility that a particular trading
In particular, the concern that trading in the S02 program could result in "upwind" sources
in the Midwestern region, disproportionately increasing emissions that affect "downwind"
areas in the Northeast, did not occur. In fact, due to the number of large plants in the
Midwest as well as Title IV's allocation method, there was a disproportionate decrease in
emissions in the Midwest, as Midwest sources contributed a disproportionate 60 percent to
80 percent of emissions reductions. The working of the trading program helped to actually
reduce emissions in this region with historically high S02 levels.
An appropriate conclusion seems to be that in the power sector, any significant group of
sources would be expected to behave similarly in a cap-and-trade program, and so negate the
idea that there will be emissions shifting. Further research is needed on how many sources
need to be included in a trading program in order for it to exhibit such consistency; the
evidence from the OTC program at a state level suggests that even a few sources may be
enough.
Id. at 16.
133. See Fowlie et al., supra note 64, at 32.
134. Id. at 34.
135. Modeling of carbon trading systems shows modest impacts on the use of coal versus natural
gas. In the context of A.B. 32, the California Air Resources Board's economic analysis indicated
decreases in both coal and natural gas in the electricity generation sector by 2025, with the decrease in
coal use being much more pronounced in most scenarios. CAL. AIR RES. BD., UPDATED ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 115-18 (2010). An EPA study of
proposed federal climate legislation showed an increase in the use of coal under business as usual, but a
modest decrease under the proposed legislation, which included emissions trading. U.S. EPA, EPA
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN POWER ACT IN THE 11ITH CONGRESS 43 (2010).
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scheme could favor reducing emissions at cleaner plants rather than dirtier ones
needs to be demonstrated, not simply assumed. Similarly, where it targets a
heterogeneous industry or operates across multiple industries, we need some
specific reason to believe that more polluting elements would cut back
production less or adopt fewer technological responses in reaction to the cap-
and-trade scheme.
4. Choosing a Baseline to Evaluate the Distributional Impacts of Cap-
and- Trade: Status Quo or Command-and-Control?
While the foregoing discussion assumes that the baseline for analyzing the
fairness of a cap-and-trade program consists of the emission levels prior to
imposition of the cap-and-trade scheme, another possible baseline is an
alternative regulatory scheme. For instance, we might assess a trading
program's impact relative to a requirement that industry use the best available
technology to reduce emissions. This is a difficult comparison to make for two
reasons. First, it may be feasible to demand greater overall emission cuts
through a cap-and-trade scheme because the cost is lower than with traditional
regulations.136 Second, it is not easy to forecast emissions under a hypothetical
best-technology requirement. In order to make an accurate comparison, we
would need to determine what the best technology regulation would require for
each industry. This may be difficult to do without actually going through a
parallel regulatory process, completing a full set of regulations, and then
comparing the full program with cap and trade. If cap and trade reduces
pollution levels for disadvantaged communities, but technology-based
regulations produce even greater reductions for disadvantaged communities,
this may count in favor of the technology-based regulations. As discussed
above, this does not appear to have been true for the RECLAIM program. But,
choosing the cap-and-trade system if it has other advantages that weigh heavily
in its favor, such as lower overall cost, is not necessarily unjust. It is not clear
that society should adopt unnecessarily expensive means of reaching a goal in
order to aid disadvantaged communities, particularly if more cost-efficient
ways of helping those communities exist.
Even if a technology requirement is more effective in reducing co-
pollutants, it may not necessarily be more desirable, even from the perspective
of disadvantaged communities. Because of its greater expense, it will curtail
output more severely, resulting in higher consumer costs that will be felt
disproportionately by low-income groups. 137 Moreover, it may not be possible
136. The cost difference can be quite large. See Dallas Burtraw, Anthony Paul & Matt Woerman,
Retail Electricity Price Savings from Compliance Flexibility in GHG Standards for Stationary Sources
21 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 11-30, 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-l l-30.pdf ("The largest change in consumer costs is an increase of $7 billion per
year that occurs under the inflexible standard, due to the increase in electricity prices.").
137. See discussion infra Part IV.
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to enact any emissions reductions without the cost-savings of the cap-and-trade
scheme. We have seen how difficult it is to adopt CO2 reductions in any form,
and increasing the price or decreasing the political acceptability of the
emissions reduction plan will only make the process more difficult.
Finally, it may be cheaper to use a cap-and-trade scheme to control one
pollutant and other measures to control co-pollutants, rather than trying to do
both through a single measure. Separate control measures, such as EPA's new
regulation of toxic emissions by power plants,138 can be aimed directly at
specific co-pollutants. This approach is more efficient than modifying
regulations of another pollutant in order to maximize reductions of the co-
pollutant-the "two birds with one stone" technique is unlikely to be the most
cost-effective way of achieving multiple reduction goals, even if emissions of
the pollutants are frequently correlated.
Energy markets are very complex. Depending on the technologies and tax
and regulatory policies involved, emissions trading programs and best-
technology regulations may take different forms and have various effects on
production and emissions. The qualitative arguments made here are no
substitute for detailed modeling and empirical analysis. It may be true that
direct regulation, while probably more expensive, would decrease emissions
more than a cap-and-trade system. However, the initial plausibility of the idea
that a market solution is inherently likely to increase or maintain emissions by
dirtier emitters is less convincing upon closer examination. The plausibility
factor derives from the observation that industry would like to continue using
older, dirtier plants and would be happy to receive the emission allowances or
offsets that would allow it to do so. But the assumption that this is likely to
happen is weaker once we realize that emission allowances are in scarce
supply, and that using these rights for dirtier plants means having to cut further
emissions from cleaner plants.
5. What Does Fairness Require?
At this point, it is important to think more carefully about the concept of
fairness. One might argue that fairness requires at least that disadvantaged
communities should receive no greater pollution exposure due to the trading
system than they received previously. At the other extreme, one might argue
that their interests be given the highest priority, so that society should select the
emissions reduction method likely to produce the greatest possible benefits for
these communities.139 Intermediate positions might use proportional reductions
of co-pollutants across all communities as a benchmark, or require somewhat
138. Information about the rule and links to the rule and related documents can be found at
Mercury, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/hg/index.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2012).
139. Note, however, that this method would likely produce a higher cost of compliance, which
would be felt by disadvantaged communities in the form of higher energy costs. See discussion infra
Part IV.
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greater than proportional reductions for disproportionately pollution-impacted
communities as a form of affirmative action.
Without trying to fully resolve these normative issues-and absent very
strong countervailing considerations-worsening the pollution burden for
already disproportionately affected communities seems unacceptable. One
countervailing consideration might be dramatically higher costs for alternative
regulatory systems, which would be passed on to consumers and would
disproportionately burden the same communities economically. Another
countervailing consideration would be the political impossibility of instituting
any other method for responding to a pressing emissions problem like climate
change. 140
In the context of climate change, it seems particularly misguided to give
overriding priority to disadvantaged communities within the United States at
the expense of even more disadvantaged communities elsewhere. From the
point of view of social justice, they are not most at risk from climate change,
which will have the cruelest impact on citizens of the poorest nations. 141 As the
economist Thomas Schelling explains, "dikes can't save Bangladesh [from
climate-change induced sea-level rise]: not only is there too much coastline, but
dikes would produce fresh water floods [because] [r]ivers cannot rise up over a
dike to reach the sea."142 Therefore, "tens of millions of Bangladeshi would
have to migrate or die." 143 Given the seriousness of the situation, we should
not allow disputes about the impact of co-pollutants on disadvantaged
communities in the United States imperil the adoption of effective climate
policies.144
140. while we may agree on the importance of improving the welfare of disadvantaged
communities, this cannot be the highest priority of every government program, particularly where that is
not the program's main purpose. It is reasonable to argue that government actions should reduce the
relative disadvantage of communities heavily burdened by pollution where feasible, but it is less clear
how high a priority this should merit compared with other program goals. A stronger priority should
attach to ensuring that the program does not harm disadvantaged communities compared with the status
quo.
141. See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 39-40 (2010).
142. Thomas C. Schelling, Climate Change: The Certainties, the Uncertainties, and What They
Imply About Action, 4 THE ECONOMIST'S VOICE 1 (2007).
143. Id. Additionally, climate change threatens current income levels in poor countries and the
severe weather events and rainfall variability (especially drought) that accompany it impair their
prospects for economic growth. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
STERN REVIEw 123-24 (2007).
144. To be sure, environmental justice advocates in the United States may doubt the actual
effectiveness of cap-and-trade systems. However, as the Introduction explains, that issue is beyond the
scope of this Article. If an emissions trading program would not be effective, obviously it should not be
used. However, that conclusion does not require basis in equity concerns. This Article is focused on the
question of whether cap and trade is fair, not whether it represents the optimal regulatory approach given
all possible alternatives.
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B. The Hot Spot/ Co-Pollutant Problem in Real Trading Schemes
Although empirical evidence is limited, it seems not to support concerns
that hot spots will necessarily develop as a result of cap-and-trade programs.
The oldest and best-tested program, the U.S. Acid Rain Program, does not
appear to have led to increased emissions of the capped pollutants in high-
percentage minority communities-although "poorly educated communities"
did experience increased SO2 emissions as a result of trading.145 Even with
respect to the RECLAIM program, which sparked great criticism among
environmental justice advocates, evidence suggests that the hot spot issue was
greatly overblown. In particular, an empirical study analyzing data from the
period from 1990 to 2005 concluded that the program's emission reductions
were spread across communities-that is, disadvantaged communities did
better with emissions trading than they would have under conventional
regulation.146 The study found that sources in the program reduced their
emissions approximately 20 percent more than similar sources covered by
conventional pollution control regulations, presumably because the lower cost
of the program made it politically feasible to mandate greater pollution
reductions. 147 Further, it found that no particular demographic group
experienced higher pollution exposures relative to the use of conventional
regulations.148 However, the benefits beyond those of conventional regulation
were not spread equally, with high-income households and whites receiving the
largest reductions in pollution relative to conventional regulation.149 Still, the
key lesson is that no group was harmed by the use of cap and trade versus
conventional pollution reductions. It may be regrettable that the greatest
pollution reductions did not flow to the disadvantaged, but they are still better
off than under conventional regulation.
Whether the benefits from co-pollutant reductions are distributed fairly
has emerged as a significant issue in the debate about California's new cap-
and-trade system for greenhouse gases.150 The Global Warming Solutions Act,
commonly known simply as "A.B. 32," is one of the most ambitious efforts in
the world to attempt to address climate change.151
145. See Ringquist, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
146. See Fowlie et al., supra note 64, at 35. For background on the RECLAIM program's
development, see Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets:
Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645 (2000). In Fowlie et al., supra note 64, at 2 app. B,
the authors report the results of previous studies, which ranged widely in terms of their assessments of
the RECLAIM program.
147. See Fowlie et al., supra note 64, at 35.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. For information about A.B. 32, see Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL.
AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
151. For details about the proposed regulations and their likely effects on emissions, see Rhead
Enion California Cap-and-Trade Math, LEGAL PLANET (Nov. 16, 2010), http://legalplanet.wordpress.
com/2010/l1/16/california-cap-and-trade-math/. According to Enion:
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A.B. 32 explicitly recognizes the importance of environmental justice. It
mandates that the implementing agency-the California Air Resources Board
(CARB)-consider emissions impacts, "including localized impacts in
communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution," and design
any trading system "to prevent any increase in the emissions of toxic air
contaminants or criteria air pollutants" such as SO2, NOx, and particulate
matter. 152 This language suggests that CARB is mandated to avoid increases in
co-pollutants compared with the status quo, but otherwise need only consider
localized effects as one factor in its deliberations.
Under section 38591, an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee must
advise the regulator.153 In a letter from October 1, 2008, the advisory
committee expressed concern that the public health impacts of a cap-and-trade
program were not being sufficiently considered and complained about the lack
of consideration of using a carbon fee as an alternative to carbon trading.' 5 4
The advisory committee's concerns were not accepted by the government.
In a 2010 study, the California Department of Public Health considered the
possibility of hotspots and the effect of A.B. 32 on conventional pollutants,
such as particulates, and concluded that "the potential negative health effects
from a cap-and-trade program in California are expected to be negligible to
minor, and readily mitigated with targeted mitigation efforts."1 55 The CARB
estimated that the cap-and-trade measures would lead to about a 4 percent
If covered emitters take full advantage of the 8% allowed offsets, the first year when emitters
will need to reduce their actual business as usual (BAU) emissions is 2017. This assumes
efficient use of banking and full offsets.
If covered emitters also tap into the CARB reserve along with the 8% offsets, then 2019 is
the first year when the cap will be low enough to require more than offsets and reserve
credits to meet the cap.
If covered emitters reduced emissions 6.6% below the BAU forecast each year, the rest of
reductions could be met through offsets and banking through 2020.
2015 is a crucial year for the cap-and-trade program. The expansion of the cap to
accommodate emissions from distributed use of fuels more than doubles the cap and
therefore the amount of emission allowances (and offsets) in play.
Id. If these projections are right, the trading system would not become relevant until 2020. One climate
change expert characterized the proposed rule as "in its major structural components ... one of the most
thoughtfully designed cap-and-trade programs proposed to date." Michael Wara, At Least 1 Flower
Blooms: CARB Releases Cap-and-Trade Draft Regulation, ENvTL. & ENERGY INSIGHTS (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/enrlp/2010/11/05/at-least-l-flower-blooms-carb-releases-cap-and-trade-
draft-regulation/.
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(1)-(2) (West 2011).
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591 (West 2011).
154. Letter from the Environmental Justice Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 to Chairman Mary Nichols and Exec. Officer James Goldstene
of the Cal. Air Resources Bd. I (Oct. 1, 2008) (supplying the committee's recommendations on the
Draft AB 32 Scoping Plan), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/ejac comments-final.pdf
[hereinafter AC Letter].
155. CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF A CAP-AND-TRADE
FRAMEWORK 5 (2010).
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overall decline in criteria pollutants from the electricity sector. 156 Based on
detailed case studies of four communities, the CARB concluded that emission
decreases were likely, but that even in the unlikely event that cap-and-trade
scheme resulted in higher emissions than under business as usual, the increases
would be relatively insignificant because they would be dwarfed by other
trends. 157
When CARB failed to adopt the suggestions of the Environmental Justice
Advisory Committee, environmental justice advocates filed suit.158 The trial
judge ruled that CARB had violated the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) because it had not adequately analyzed alternatives to a cap-and-trade
system.159 However, the court held that, by using a study of a specific,
"typical" community to analyze potential environmental justice impacts, CARB
successfully fulfilled its duty to consider the local effects of reducing co-
pollutants.160 In response, CARB issued a new environmental assessment that
adopts a strategy of adaptive management to deal with potential co-pollutant
impacts.161 The assessment forecasts that localized air quality impacts are
156. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CO-POLLUTANT EMIssIoNS ASSESSMENT P-44 app. P (2010)
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtradel0/capv6appp.pdf. In terms of power plants, CARB
believed that the system would have only a small effect on emissions:
Any regulation that seeks to reduce carbon from the electricity that California uses, whether a
cap-and- trade regulation, a carbon fee, or direct regulations, would provide similar
incentives to shift from coal to natural gas. Many other external factors, such as
transportation costs, pipeline capacity, demand by a growing population, and other
environmental programs, affect decisions on whether to increase operation of existing power
plants, build new power plants, or the potential location of these power plants. While cap-
and-trade will be one more consideration, ARB staff expects that these market, economic,
and infrastructure factors will continue to drive such decisions.
Id at P-49.
157. Id. at P-125.
158. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
159. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-509562, at 3-4 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Dec. 16, 2011).
160. Id. at 16. In more detail, the case study functioned as follows:
ARB and the California Department of Public Health (CDHP) [ ] completed a joint
cumulative impacts study of the AB 32 cap-and-trade regulations. ARB analyzed air impacts
and CDHP carried out a limited Health Impact Assessment. The City of Richmond was one
of four representative areas chosen for detailed analysis. The air pollution assessment
focused on emissions from industrial and electricity generating facilities subject to the cap-
and-trade regulation. It evaluated two scenarios that could produce negative impacts, one
where the seven "cap-and-trade" facilities in the Richmond area increased their emissions by
4 percent, and another where a new power plant would be established in the area. Under each
scenario, the impact of increased air pollutant emissions was predicted to be negligible or
minor.
Ken Kloc, Air Pollution & Environmental Inequity in the San Francisco Bay Area 17-18 (Ctr. on Urban
Envtl. Law, Gray Paper No. 1, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgilviewcontent.
cgi?article=1443&context-pubs. Kloc offers some criticisms of the study. See id
161. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., SUPPLEMENT TO THE AB 32 SCOPING PLAN FUNCTIONAL
EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT 16 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/
Supplement toSPFED.pdf.
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"highly unlikely" and spatially uncertain, 162 but expresses a "commitment to
monitoring the data on localized air quality impacts and to adjusting a Cap-and-
trade Regulation adopted, if warranted."1 63
The California experience and recent studies suggest a combination of
measures to deal with potential fairness issues regarding co-pollutants. The first
is a consideration of projected impacts on sample communities. The second is
the use of adaptive management to the extent that unforeseen impacts might
arise in the future. 164 The appropriate tool, if such impacts do arise in the
future, would depend on the situation. Some possibilities include geographic
restrictions on trading, increased regulation of the co-pollutants, and use of
auction proceeds to fund environmental improvements or pubic health
programs in the impacted communities. 165
A related problem is posed by the use of offsets.166 Greenhouse gas
offsets, also commonly called carbon offsets, allow an emitter to meet the
requirements of a cap-and-trade scheme by purchasing a greenhouse gas
reduction by a party that is outside the trading system.167 Offsets might take
the form of reduced emissions in the United States or perhaps elsewhere
through methods such as the substitution of a natural gas electricity generator
for a coal-fired generator in China. Alternatively, they might involve the
creation of new carbon sinks. 168 If an offset system is properly designed, it
162. Id.
163. Id. at 33. In December 2011, the judge ruled that the updated assessment adequately justified
CARB's decision to select a greenhouse gas emissions trading program. See Debra Kahn, Judge Deems
State's Cap-and-Trade Plan in Compliance with State Law, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/12/08.
164. This Article does not argue that disproportionate distributions of co-pollutants should be
ignored. But the treatment of these issues must be more nuanced than simply rejecting a whole approach
to regulation (e.g., cap and trade). Instead, I agree that
[e]ffective and equitable climate change mitigation will likely not be in the form of a fixed
silver bullet strategy that is uniformly applied across geographic space. Instead, these actions
will likely necessitate multiple responses within one or more adaptive frameworks that take
into account the heterogeneity of the human populations they seek to protect.
Shonkoffet al., supra note 29, at 176.
165. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,287, 10,303 (2008), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol38/38.10287.pdf.
166. Offsets have been an important component of U.S. climate legislative proposals. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL34436, THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 1 (2008) ("An
offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not
covered by an emission reduction program. If a cap-and-trade program includes offsets, regulated
entities have the opportunity to purchase them to help meet compliance obligations.").
167. For an introductory discussion of offsets and their potential problems, see Michael Wara,
Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1759
(2008).
168. For example:
Trees, plants, and soils sequester carbon, removing it from the earth' s atmosphere.
Biological sequestration projects generally involve activities that either increase existing
sequestration; or maintain the existing sequestration on land that might otherwise be
disturbed and release some or all of the sequestered carbon. This offset category includes
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lowers the overall cost of reducing CO2 because it offers sources within the
trading system the option of using offsets when doing so is cheaper than buying
allowances or reducing their own emissions.'69  However, it does so by
requiring fewer in-system emissions reductions than would otherwise be
required and, therefore, results in correspondingly smaller reductions of in-
system co-pollutants. Thus, a trading system that allows offsetting has fewer
collateral co-pollutant benefits, particularly for lower-income communities in
high pollution areas, than alternatives such as a carbon tax or direct regulation
or cap and trade without offsets. 170 On the other hand, the reduced cost of the
system should mean significantly lower energy costs, which is in the interest of
low-income communities. 171
Ideally, co-pollutants would already be subject to optimal regulatory
control to minimize potential harm to disadvantaged communities. If that is not
currently the case, it is still better, in principle, to deal with co-pollutants
separately, rather than allowing them to influence the choice of the regulatory
instrument used to achieve CO2 emissions reductions or the specific design of a
CO2 trading system. As mentioned in Part III.A.4, co-pollutants are not
perfectly correlated with CO2 emissions, so reducing CO2 is an imprecisely
targeted way of reducing its co-pollutants.172 Additionally, steps taken to
sequestration that results from agriculture and forestry activities, and is sometimes referred to
as land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects.
RAMSEUR, supra note 166, at 5.
169. According to Ramseur:
A central argument in support of offsets is that their use makes an emissions reduction
program more cost-effective. A wide range of activities could be undertaken that would
generate offsets. Many of these individual activities would likely generate a relatively small
quantity of offsets (in terms of tons), but in the aggregate, their climate change mitigation
potential is substantial. Arguably, direct regulation of these sources--either through a cap-
and-trade program or regulatory command-and-control provisions-may not be cost-
effective because of the administrative burden.
Id. at 12.
170. Offsetting also raises other concerns, for example:
[T]he primary concern regarding offsets is their integrity. To be credible, an offset should
equate to an emission reduction from a direct emission source, such as a smokestack or
exhaust pipe. This issue is critical, if offsets are to be used in an emissions trading program.
However, implementing this objective would likely present challenges.
Id. at 18. Finally, there are reasons for concern about the environmental impacts of offset projects. See
Kylie Wilson, Access to Justice for Victims of the International Carbon Offset Industry, 38 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 967(2011).
171. See Burtraw, Paul & Woerman, supra note 136, at 3, 14 (reporting that a flexible standard,
involving at least some trading, produces dramatically smaller increases in consumer prices and finding
that technology-based standards result in retiring more older coal plants from service, while a flexible
standard results in greater energy efficiency improvements).
172. Schatzki and Stavins argue that
[w]hile some propose placing various restrictions or conditions on emission allowance
trading in a GHG cap-and-trade system in order to achieve particular environmental justice
objectives, such modifications would have highly uncertain impacts on air quality because of
the complex and varied relationships between GHG and co-pollutant emissions. Not only
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reduce CO 2 are just a subset of the possible ways of reducing the co-pollutant,
and it can only be by coincidence that this subset contains the ideal way of
reducing the co-pollutant. However, given the complicated politics of pollution
control, the ideal approach may not always be feasible in practice.
It is important to be realistic about our alternatives. Failure to regulate at
all carries clear costs for disadvantaged communities in the form of emissions
impacts. Even if technology-based regulation would reduce co-pollutants more
than a cap-and-trade system, there are tradeoffs. If the economic theory behind
cap and trade is correct, technology-based regulation may cost more to achieve
comparable total emissions reductions, increasing the financial burden on low-
income consumers in the form of higher energy prices.173
In situations where hot spots of the regulated pollutant itself are a
problem, it may well be worth redesigning the cap-and-trade system
accordingly. For example, despite being relatively well mixed in the
atmosphere, some research suggests the possibility that there may be localized
heat island effects around major sources of CO 2 that can lead to increased
concentrations of health-hazardous ground-level ozone and particulate
matter.174 Furthermore, a recent economic study shows that adjusting the
trading program can provide substantial benefits when pollution damages vary
significantly with location. 175 But it is unclear how frequently such geographic
does the relationship between GHG and co-pollutant emissions vary widely across sources,
but so does the relationship between reductions in GHG and co-pollutant emission achieved
by various abatement options. Further, unlike the benefits from reducing GHG emissions, the
health and environmental benefits from reducing co-pollutants can vary substantially
depending on where and when those reductions occur.
TODD SCHATZKI & ROBERT N. STAVINS, ANALYSIS GRP., INC., ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CONCERNS IN THE DESIGN OF CALIFORNIA'S CLIMATE POLICY ii (2009), available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/EnvironmentalJustice.pdf. As they
explain:
[O]n average, fuel combustion in electricity generation and petroleum refining generates less
than one pound of NOx emissions per metric ton of GHG emissions. By contrast, fuel
combustion in other manufacturing and industrial sectors generates about five pounds of NOx
emissions per metric ton of GHG emissions, and fuel use by heavy-duty trucks generates
about 25 pounds of NOx per metric ton of GHG.
Id. at 6.
173. See discussion infra Part IV.
174. See Leber, supra note 25.
175. See MEREDITH FOWLIE & NICHOLAS MULLER, DESIGNING MARKETS FOR POLLUTION WHEN
DAMAGES VARY ACROSS SOURCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE NOx BUDGET PROGRAM 2 (2010), available
at http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/seminar/Seminar20l11202.pdf. A countervailing concern is that
making such adjustments would limit the scope of trading and impair the operation of the market:
The difficulty stems from the restricted opportunities for trade and added transaction costs
that are integral to the imposition of a layer of spatial limitations upon pollution markets. As
a result of these concerns, Congress rejected proposals to incorporate geographical
restrictions into the SO2 cap-and-trade program it instituted under the 1990 Clean Air Act. In
similar fashion, the South Coast Air Quality Management District . . . did not restrict the
location of nitrogen oxide and sulfur oxide trades in pollution rights under the . . .
[RECLAIM] program instituted in 1992.
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disparities exist in CO 2 impacts based on local variations in emissions or
whether they correlate with socioeconomic boundaries.
To summarize, cap and trade does not appear to have an intrinsic tendency
to favor emissions reductions at cleaner plants as opposed to the dirtier plants
that may more often exist in disadvantaged communities. If anything, the
general tendency is to the contrary. Unless there are specific features of the
regulated industry or modeling results that suggest otherwise, fairness to
disadvantaged communities should not serve as an obstacle to use of cap and
trade. However, if emissions trading does turn out to result in disproportionate
levels of co-pollutants in disadvantaged communities, the regulator should be
prepared to take appropriate action to address the situation and counteract that
effect.
IV. FAIRNESS TO Low-INCOME CONSUMERS
Because of the scale of the climate change problem, the costs of
transitioning to a low-carbon economy will be large and the process will be
lengthy. Putting a price on carbon-whether through a trading system, a carbon
tax, or otherwise-will increase energy costs. Even if a cap-and-trade program
distributes allowances for free, the existence of a cap will force industry to
reduce its total emissions by reducing output, installing new technologies, or
switching to cleaner-burning fuel, all of which will increase prices. 176 In this
respect, it has a similar effect to a carbon tax. Indeed, a system of technology-
based regulations would also impose costs on utilities that would be passed
along to consumers in the form of higher energy costs.
Aside from the general effects of capping emissions on consumers as a
whole, there are likely to be enhanced ramifications for the subset of "low-
income" consumers that are directly relevant to equity analyses. Therefore, if
cap and trade allows society to obtain comparable environmental benefits to
conventional regulation at a lower cost, this feature has implications for social
equity as well as for regulatory efficiency. Lower program costs mean less
expense to be passed along to consumers. This decrease in the economic
burden of regulation has particular significance for low-income consumers.
Therefore, cap and trade may have equity benefits as well as efficiency benefits
over other forms of emissions regulation-assuming, of course, that the system
works as planned.
The equity implications of emissions trading are particularly important for
direct energy costs (differentiated from indirect energy costs associated with
energy intensive goods and services). For example, economic analysis indicates
that 90 percent of a carbon tax on coal would be shifted to consumers through
energy prices, illustrating why keeping compliance costs low is important for
Morag-Levine, supra note 29, at 198.
176. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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consumers (especially low-income consumers who can least afford price
increases).177 Increases in energy prices are regressive: "They impact the poor
more than the rich, since the poor spend a larger portion of their budgets on
basic needs, like heating and power."1 78 This regressive effect could be
partially ameliorated by subsidizing the adoption of efficiency measures in low-
income households. 179 Energy efficiency measures have a dual effect: they
reduce energy use and hence emissions, thus helping to meet the cap, while
also providing cost savings to offset the higher energy prices caused by climate
change mitigation efforts.
Determining who ultimately pays the price on carbon, and how the burden
correlates with wealth, is not a simple matter. Using current household income
as a gauge may be misleading since some households with low incomes might
be composed of students who will likely enjoy a higher income later in life or
of retirees who enjoy a better standard of living due to savings than their
present income would suggest. 8 0 For instance, a law student would register as
having a low income, even if the student was from an affluent background and
would later enjoy a high income as a law firm partner. Similarly, a retired
person might enjoy a high standard of living by drawing down savings, but
might also have a low income derived from current profits on investments.
Both individuals may be less deserving of solicitude than others who are mired
in a lifetime of poverty. Thus, there is an argument that the accuracy of the
analysis can be improved by considering equity in terms of an individual's
income over a whole lifetime, rather than at any one given moment.
In a social equity analysis, considering impacts over a lifetime may make
a substantial difference. Putting a price on carbon seems "considerably less
regressive when lifetime income measures are used than when annual income
measures are used."181 However, lifetime income is subject to considerable
uncertainties because it "relies on strong assumptions about household
consumption decisions . . . ." For example, it assumes that consumers are
completely rational about borrowing and saving to smooth out their
consumption over their entire lives. 182 In addition, it is normatively
questionable whether a low-income household's present needs should receive
177. See Sebastian Rausch, Gilbert Metcalf & John M. Reilly, Distributional Impacts of Carbon
Pricing: A General Equilibrium Approach with Micro-Data for Households 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 17087, 2011), available at www.nber.org/papers/w17087.
178. Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1155 (2009); see
also Dinan Testimony, supra note 94, at 6 ("[M]easured as a share of income, spending on energy-
intensive items by households in the lowest income quintile averages more than five times that by
households in the highest income quintile.").
179. See Dinan Testimony, supra note 94, at 17 ("Using revenues from auctioning allowances to
subsidize household investments that reduced carbon dioxide emissions would lower the cost to
households of adapting to higher energy prices. For example, subsidizing weatherization improvements
would enable house-holds to use less energy for heating and cooling.").
180. See Rausch, Metcalf & Reilly, supra note 177, at 14.
181. Metcalf, supra note 91, at 404.
182. Id. at 405.
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less attention on the basis that it has experienced or will experience higher
income at some other point in time. For instance, a law student may be
struggling to make ends meet notwithstanding the likelihood of higher income
in the future. Because of the empirical issues and the unresolved normative
questions, it would be a mistake to rely exclusively on lifetime income analysis
in considering equity.
Regardless of which approach we use to assess economic impacts on
consumers, a key social equity issue in emissions trading is: who captures the
value of emissions allowances? Or, to put it another way, who collects the
carbon price? The situation is actually quite complicated.
For example, allowance value may be captured by energy firms if
distribution is free or by the government if allowances are auctioned, and, in
either case, taxes and government spending can redistribute the benefits. 183
Therefore, quite apart from the distinction between free and auctioned
allowances, pricing carbon may have a host of indirect effects that could
influence wages and returns on capital, which themselves will impact income
distribution. If allowances are free, energy firms and their shareholders will
have higher income, which may be taxed by the government, or firms may
engage in greater expenditures that are subject to a value-added tax (in
countries that have such taxes).1 84 If, on the other hand, the government
collects revenue from auctioning allowances, it can either spend those funds or
reduce other taxes. This choice, too, will impact demand for energy by the
recipients of the benefits, and hence energy prices and availability.
Additionally, because the government is itself a direct (and indirect) energy
consumer, taxpayers must absorb higher government energy costs.
Untangling these effects is no simple matter, but the overall effect of a
cap-and-trade system (or other emissions reduction regulation scheme) likely
burdens poorer households more than richer ones. The specific distributional
effects depend on the overall strategy, involving not just the cap-and-trade
system but also tax policy. For example, a 2002 analysis demonstrated that, if
the government gave emissions allowances away for free and used the
increased taxes received from the resulting firm revenues to reduce the
corporate tax rate, lower income households could lose up to 6 percent of their
income, whereas wealthy households could actually see an increase in
income. 185 On the other hand, the study found that cap-and-trade programs that
183. See, e.g., Dinan Testimony, supra note 94, at 7.
184. See Cait Murphy, Will the U.S. Adopt a Value-Added Tax?, CBS MONEYWATCH (Apr. 9,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-51411133/vat-will-the-us-adopt-a-value-added-tax/
(describing a value added tax as a tax on all goods and services that is assessed at every "stage of
production and distribution" with each business in the chain deducting the tax the previous business paid
so that each is responsible only for paying tax on the quantum of value it added).
185. Terry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance Trading: How
Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 199, 213 (2002). Note that
there are some technical issues with estimating household consumption that could significantly affect
this result. See id. at 209-10.
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encompassed international trades improved the financial situation of lower
income households compared with wealthier households. 186 Broadening the
geographic scope of trading provides more opportunities for companies that can
reduce emissions more cheaply to sell their allowances; this in turn brings
down the price of allowances so that utilities have lower costs, resulting in
decreased energy expenditures for low-income consumers. 187
It is helpful to distinguish between auctioning and free distribution. The
immediate effect of auctioning emissions allowances is equivalent to a carbon
tax, which falls most heavily on lower-income households.18 8 However, this
regressive effect could be countered by changes in the income tax such as
refundable tax credits for energy expenditures, resulting in distributional
neutrality. 189 Moreover, the income sources, such as government transfer
payments, of some members of low-income households may be less affected by
carbon pricing, thereby reducing regressive effects. 190 A recent study indicates
that the distributional impacts of an auction-based allowance trading program
are small if government revenues are returned to individuals in the form of a
taxable "dividend."1 91 In fact, the impacts might even be progressive if
revenues are used either to improve the tax treatment of low-income
individuals by decreasing payroll taxes or expanding the earned-income
credit1 92 or to fund an energy benefit program (administered, for example, with
food-stamp benefits) to help cover energy costs. 193
On the other hand, free distribution is more regressive than auctioning1 94
because the primary beneficiaries are the shareholders of companies that are
able to sell extra allowances, and shareholders are rarely poor people. 195 Free
distribution raises energy prices-because companies must still reduce
186. Id. at 219.
187. Id.
188. Metcalf, supra note 91, at 407.
189. Id. 406-07.
190. Id. at 413.
191. See Dallas Burtraw, Richard Sweeney & Margaret Walls, The Incidence of U.S. Climate
Policy: Alternative Uses ofRevenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction 14 (Res. for the Future, Discussion
Paper 09-17-REV, 2009), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-17-REV.pdf
("[H]ouseholds in the lowest deciles see a dramatic improvement in their well-being as a result of the
lump-sum dividend of allowance revenues.").
192. The effect on low-income households is quite dramatic: "As expected, households in the
lower-income deciles benefit the most from this policy. The average household in the first decile
experiences a net consumer surplus gain of nearly 4.56 percent of income." Id. at 21.
193. See Dinan Testimony, supra note 94, at 16.
194. See Joshua Blonz, Dallas Burtraw & Margaret A. Walls, Climate Policy's Uncertain
Outcomes for Households: The Role of Complex Allocation Schemes in Cap-and-Trade, 10 B.E. J. OF
EcON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2010). For instance, according to Burtraw, Sweeney & Walls, supra note
191, at 3-4, one study found that the "distributional outcome hinges crucially on whether allowances are
grandfathered or auctioned and whether revenues from allowance auctions, or from indirect taxation of
allowance rents, are used to cut payroll taxes or corporate taxes or provide lump-sum transfers."
195. Burtraw, Sweeney & Walls, supra note 191, at 5.
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emissions, buy extra allowances, or pay for offsets-and provides no direct
mechanism for offsetting this additional burden. 196
In the United States, recent congressional proposals to establish
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems have included complex allowance
allocation schemes, incorporating mixtures of free distribution, auctions, and
various other revenue mechanisms such as requirements to use some allowance
proceeds to reduce consumer costs. 197 A recent study suggests that the overall
effect of these proposals would be progressive.198 A relatively simple
alternative would be a cap-and-dividend approach: selling some allowances and
using the proceeds to fund a per capita payment to individuals.' 99 Other
methods of dealing with equity concerns exist-for example providing a
refundable income tax credit. 200
196. To be sure, since retail electricity markets are highly regulated, offsetting subsidies could be
provided to low-income consumers at the expense of other users. However, these subsidies would lower
the incentive for low-income consumers to decrease their energy use. Another option would be to allow
consumers to sell offsets based on their decreased energy use or other carbon-positive measures. See
Michael Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
55 (2008). Under either free distribution or auctioning, progressive energy pricing (which ratchets up
energy costs in standard increments above a base level) would ensure that the marginal rate of keeping
surplus lighting on in a mansion is not the same as the energy cost of turning on a single bulb in a studio
apartment.
197. Blonz, Burtraw & Walls, supra note 194, at *2.
198. Id at *3. The United States also has several existing programs specifically designed to assist
low-income households with energy costs. See Super, supra note 27, at 1168-75. However, the
economic models in the study do not seem to include these subsidies.
199. According to a Congressional Budget Office analyst:
CBO previously examined the distributional effects of a cap-and-trade program that would
reduce CO 2 emissions in the United States by 15 percent. That study concluded that lower-
income households could be better off as a result of the policy (even without including any
benefits from reducing climate change) if the government chose to sell the allowances and
use the revenue to pay an equal lump-sum rebate to every household in the United States. In
that case, the size of the rebate would be larger than the average increase in spending by low-
income households resulting from the higher price of energy. . . . High-income households
would be worse off under that scenario (again, excluding any benefit from reducing the risks
associated with climate change) because the average increase in their spending would be
larger than the rebate.
Dinan Testimony, supra note 94, at 7.
200. See Tracey M. Roberts, Mitigating the Distributional Impacts of Climate Policy, 67 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 209 (2010). The proposed Australian carbon tax contains such a refund mechanism. See
Carbon Tax Plan Supports Low Income Australians, PRO BONO AUSTL. (July 11, 2011, 2:08 PM),
http://www.probonoaustralia.com.aulnews/2011/07/carbon-tax-plan-supports-low-income-australians.
The plan attempts to tie rebates to need. It provides:
Up to $338 extra per year for single pensioners and self-funded retirees, and up to $510 per
year for pensioner couples combined.
Up to $110 per child for a family that receives Family Tax Benefit Part A.
Up to $69 extra for families that receive Family Tax Benefit Part B.
Up to $218 extra per year for single income support recipients and $390 per year for couples
combined for people on allowances.
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However, it is difficult to predict what the actual effects of an emissions
trading system might be. Regardless of how many variables they consider,
models can only ever hope to approximate reality. Even highly complex
economic models may not take into account the effects of CO2 Policy on
technological innovation and the development of new industries, or the
differential effects climate change is likely to have on different income groups.
Despite the unresolved complexity, three major conclusions rise to the
fore. First, putting a price on carbon, considered by itself, is likely to have a
regressive effect. This would remain true whether a carbon tax or cap and trade
is used. It would also be true for conventional regulation, which would impose
even higher costs on industry that would be passed along to consumers.
Second, the way we allocate allowances in a trading system has distributional
consequences. Free allocation of allowances to firms benefits shareholders at
the expense of consumers, with low-income consumers feeling the increased
financial burden most keenly. However, auction proceeds can be used to
counter the impact on low-income consumers and to make the program's
impact progressive rather than regressive. Third, the possible regressive effect
of emissions trading is a significant concern that should influence selection of
an allowance distribution scheme and complementary tax and spending
policies, but it should not derail efforts to put a price on carbon. Climate change
is an urgent issue, with particularly severe consequences for the global poor.
Short-term distributive problems can be resolved as a matter of program design.
Therefore, if cap and trade would be effective in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, distributive concerns should not preclude use of this tool.
CONCLUSION
Emissions trading systems have been controversial since the idea first
surfaced, based partly on fairness concerns. One important aspect of the debate
is whether the systems are effective in reaching their primary goal of reducing
total emissions at lower cost than conventional regulation. That issue has been
sidelined for purposes of this Article, but its importance cannot be refuted.
However, the debate also involves important issues of social equity. Those
issues, which are the focus of this Article, involve normative disputes that are
not easily resolved.
The normative questions are difficult and varied. Is it unfair to require
firms to purchase emission rights, when they invested in facilities at a time
when emissions were free? Is it fair to use an emissions-trading scheme when
Up to $234 per year for single parents in addition to the increased family payments they
receive.
Id. For suggestions about how to deal with timing issues in such a rebate scheme, since low-income
individuals may not be able to afford higher bills even if they later receive a refund, see Brian Galle and
Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households and the Timing of
Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 33 (2010).
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an alternative method of controlling emissions might produce greater health
benefits for disadvantaged communities? Is it fair to forego reasonable trading
program modifications that could chip away at the disproportionate pollution
burden suffered by many low-income and minority communities today? Should
we be concerned that energy price increases related to an emissions trading
system would place more of a burden on the poor than the rich because the
poor spend a greater percentage of their income on basic energy needs?
These are not only important questions as a matter of principle but because
they are an unavoidable part of any public deliberation over emissions trading.
The question of who would be relatively advantaged or disadvantaged is
important in building political coalitions for or against a proposed program.
One possible advantage of cap and trade is that there are many design elements
(such as whether to auction allowances or freely allocate them, how to deal
with offsets, and what to do with any auction proceeds) which can be modified
to address political concerns without compromising the program's core goal of
reducing overall emissions levels.
Even apart from these political concerns, the normative issues are serious
ones. Creating a cap-and-trade system is a major policy shift from a status quo
that either consists of no regulation or conventional regulatory mandates. Such
a major policy shift is bound to create significant winners and losers while
(hopefully) providing an important public benefit. The question of who should
carry the burdens associated with achieving societal goals is a key issue of
social equity. Investors who have relied on previous legal rules in making
major financial decisions and members of disadvantaged communities are not
merely special interests clamoring for better treatment; they also make
normative arguments that deserve careful consideration.
Although it is difficult to adjudicate sharply conflicting normative views
about emissions trading, we are beginning to develop a better basis for
assessing the factual issues that are linked with the normative ones. As
experience with trading systems has grown and economic analysis of the issues
has become more sophisticated, some normative concerns have been alleviated.
The currently available information supports four main conclusions.
First, auctioning is the preferred method of distributing emissions
allowances because it allows windfall benefits to be redistributed from
shareholders to consumers (in particular, low-income energy consumers).
However, if we consider burdening regulated sources with the cost of reducing
emissions unfair, a small proportion of allowances can be freely distributed to
firms in compensation.
Second, trading system designers should use case studies of low-income
and minority communities to estimate the plan's side effects on conventional
co-pollutants such as SO 2 , NOx, and particulate matter. Since the operation of
the trading system may not be completely predictable, it may be important to
investigate a range of scenarios. If this analysis suggests that the system is
likely to create, exacerbate, or maintain significant pollution hot spots,
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regulators should employ countermeasures, such as imposing additional
regulatory controls on sources that contribute to hot spots or limiting the ability
of those sources to purchase allowances. Once the trading system is in
operation, monitor pollution concentrations remains essential to ensuring that
hot spots are not developing and that disadvantaged communities are sharing
fairly in the benefits of emission reductions.
Third, the direct effect of a trading system is likely to be regressive: it will
disproportionately burden low-income households with higher energy prices.
Therefore, we should use auction revenues to counter this effect. In addition,
through use of auction proceeds or other programs, we can encourage improved
energy efficiency in low-income households to reduce the sting of price
increases. One advantage of a trading system as opposed to conventional
regulation is that, while both may increase prices for consumers, allowance
auctioning provides a funded mechanism for countering this effect.
Finally, because uncertainties surround each of these conclusions, adaptive
management is crucial. In other words, an emissions trading plan should
contain specific mechanisms to study impacts and make adjustments for effects
that are unexpected or undesirable. A vague commitment to the concept of
adaptive management is not sufficient; specific, mandatory follow-up measures
should be integrated into the initial plan where possible. Experience with cap-
and-trade systems suggests that there are often unforeseen flaws that require
modification after the system is in place.
The global nature of climate change implicates an additional fairness
issue. There is a clear relationship between gross domestic product and CO2
emissions, with richer countries using more energy and emitting more CO 2 than
their poorer counterparts. 201 Furthermore, "emissions in some countries have
imposed serious risks on others, [and, as a result,] some nations, including
those in Africa, face serious risks even though their own emissions are
trivial." 202 Our failure to take action against climate change is harming and will
continue to harm some of the poorest people on the planet, a fact that should
matter greatly to advocates of environmental justice.
If we have strong reasons to control emissions, as we do for CO 2, we
should avoid getting bogged down in domestic distributional disputes to the
detriment of addressing the fundamental environmental problem. However, it
would not be fair to exclude domestic distributional issues from the discussion
completely, even if it were politically feasible to do so. Fortunately, a growing
body of information suggests that we can constructively address many fairness
concerns through the design of the trading system and related policy
changes. 203
201. POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 141, at 38-40.
202. Id. at 101.
203. A standard view among economists is that we should pick the most economically efficient
regulatory approach and deal with any distributional issues that arise through the taxing and spending
system. But politics do not always allow this kind of rational allocation of responsibility, and, in
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Given the scope and complexity of the climate change problem, as well as
the realities of politics, we cannot expect any policy response to be perfect. But
we know how to design trading systems that are reasonably responsive to
equity concerns. We should not hold important policy decisions hostage to the
quest for an ideal response, but we need not slight legitimate concerns about
social equity.
particular, modifications in the taxation system may trigger too many political sensitivities to be
feasible. If so, distributional concerns should be considered in designing the regulatory system itself.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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